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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> The Dubai International Financial Centre >> Bank Of Singapore Limited v (1) Marj Holding Limited (2) Mohammed Ahmad Ramadhan Juma [2024] DIFC CFI 090 (03 January 2024) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ae/cases/DIFC/2024/DCFI_090.html Cite as: [2024] DIFC CFI 090, [2024] DIFC CFI 90 |
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CFI 090/2022 Bank Of Singapore Limited v (1) Marj Holding Limited (2) Mohammed Ahmad Ramadhan Juma
January 03, 2024 COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE - ORDERS
Claim No: CFI 090/2022
IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
BETWEEN
BANK OF SINGAPORE LIMITED
Claimant
and
(1) MARJ HOLDING LIMITED
(2) MOHAMMED AHMAD RAMADHAN JUMADefendants
ORDER WITH REASONS OF JUSTICE RENE LE MIERE
UPON the Judgment dated 20 November 2023
AND UPON reviewing the parties’ costs submissions dated 28 November 2023
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Defendants jointly and severally pay the Claimant’s costs of the Immediate Judgment Application to be assessed by a detailed assessment of the costs by the Registrar if not agreed.
2. The Defendants jointly and severally pay the Claimant’s costs of the Case except the extra costs caused by the misrepresentation claim to be assessed by a detailed assessment of the costs by the Registrar if not agreed.
3. The Defendants pay the Claimant the sum of AED 500,000 by way of an interim payment on account, within 14 days of the date of this Order.
Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 3 January 2024
At: 3pmSCHEDULE OF REASONS FOR COSTS ORDERS
Summary
1. By a Claim Form issued on 14 December 2022 the Claimant claimed:
(a) USD 50,638,097.72; alternatively damages as against the First and Second Defendants;
(b) Damages for misrepresentation as against the First Defendant;
(c) Interest at a rate of 5% above the Interest Rate pursuant to clause B(9) of the CTF Agreement on all amounts outstanding under the same; and
(d) Costs.
(“the Remedies”)
2. In its Particulars of Claim filed with its Claim Form, the Claimant pleaded two causes of action. The first is a claim that the Defendants were indebted to it in the amount claimed under the agreement between the Claimant and the First Defendant and a guarantee given by the Second Defendant (the “debt claim”). The second is a claim for damages for misrepresentation by the First Defendant (the “misrepresentation claim”).
3. By Application Notice CFI-090-2022/2 dated 21 June 2023 the Claimant sought immediate judgment against the Defendants on the debt claim (the “Immediate Judgment Application”).
4. After hearing Counsel for the Claimant and Counsel for the Defendants in a hearing before me on 12 October 2023 and receiving further submissions from the Claimant on 19 October, 27 October, 10 November, and 17 November 2023 and from the Defendants on 19 October, 27 October, 14 November, and 17 November, I ordered on 20 November 2023 that the Immediate Judgment Application be granted, and judgment be entered in favour of the Claimant against each of the Defendants in the sum of USD 55,884,582.50.
5. I further ordered the parties to file and serve a minute of the orders in relation to costs which they submit are appropriate together with submissions. On 28 November 2023 the Claimant filed a draft order in relation to costs together with submissions in support of its proposed order and the Defendants filed submissions in opposition to the draft orders proposed by the Claimant.
6. I will refer to the costs of the whole of the proceeding by which the Claimant seeks the Remedies as the costs of the Case.
7. The Claimant seeks orders that the Defendants jointly and severally pay the Claimant’s costs of the Case and of the Immediate Judgment Application on an indemnity basis, pay its lawyers, Al Tamimi & Co, (on behalf of the Claimant) the sum of AED 717,108 by way of an interim payment on account, and the Claimant’s costs be assessed by detailed assessment if not agreed
8. The Defendants submit that the Court should award costs in the case as opposed to granting the Claimant the costs at this stage because the misrepresentation claim is yet to be determined. The Defendants further submit that the Claimant’s statement of costs ought to be rejected because it relates to the costs of the Case rather than the costs of the Immediate Judgement Application and further is not proportionate to the purported complexity and issues in the case.
9. For the reasons which follow it will be ordered:
(a) The Defendants jointly and severally pay the Claimant’s costs of the Immediate Judgment Application to be assessed by a detailed assessment of the costs by the Registrar if not agreed.
(b) The Defendants jointly and severally pay the Claimant’s costs of the Case except the extra costs caused by the misrepresentation claim to be assessed by a detailed assessment of the costs by the Registrar if not agreed.
(c) The Defendants pay the Claimant the sum of AED 500,000 by way of an interim payment on account, within 14 days of the date of the issue of the Court’s order.
Outline of Immediate Judgment Reasons
10. The Claimant and the First Defendant, MARJ Holding Limited (“MARJ”), entered into an agreement in October 2021 pursuant to which the Claimant made certain facilities (the “Facilities”) available to MARJ (the “Facility Agreement”).
11. The Second Defendant, Mr Juma, is a director and majority shareholder of MARJ.
12. On 6 October 2021 Mr Juma signed a guarantee in favour of the Claimant, guaranteeing the obligations of MARJ to the Claimant (the “Guarantee”).
13. MARJ placed certain securities in its accounts with the Claimant which were the subject of a charge in favour of the Claimant, including certain bonds (the “Bonds”).
14. The Facilities became operational on 8 October 2021.
15. By the end of 2021, MARJ was in margin shortfall.
16. On 11 March 2022, the Claimant demanded repayment of the amounts outstanding under the Facilities and gave notice of its intention to close MARJ’s accounts and terminate the agreement. The Claimant gave notice that unless MARJ repaid the advances under the Facilities, the Claimant would proceed to liquidate the securities held in MARJ's accounts with the Claimant.
17. MARJ did not repay the outstanding advances.
18. On 15 June 2022, the Claimant terminated the Facilities and demanded repayment of the amounts outstanding under the Facilities.
19. On 14 December 2022, the Claimant commenced this action by Claim Form in which the Claimant made two claims. The first claim is that MARJ and Mr Juma are liable to the Claimant for the unpaid balance under the Facility Agreement and the Guarantee respectively (the “debt claim”). The second claim is that MARJ is liable to the Claimant for damages for misrepresentation in that MARJ misrepresented the value of the Bonds provided as security for the Facilities (the “misrepresentation claim”).
20. The Claimant applied for immediate judgment on its debt claim. The Claimant did not apply for immediate judgment on its misrepresentation claim.
21. The Defendants admitted that they had not repaid the advances under the Facilities but did not admit the amount allegedly outstanding and said that MARJ is entitled to set-off sums owed to it by the Claimant pursuant to its counterclaim for losses it has suffered as a result of breaches by the Claimant of implied terms of the Facility Agreement and regulatory obligations.
22. The Defendants asserted that various terms should be implied into the Facility Agreement, that the Claimant breached those implied terms and regulatory obligations under the DFSA Rules causing MARJ loss, and as a result MARJ has a counterclaim which it is entitled to set off against its liabilities to the Claimant.
23. Mr Juma asserted that the Guarantee is invalid because it was not properly witnessed and so could not take effect as a deed and was signed after the Claimant had agreed to grant the Facilities and so could not take effect as a contract because it lacks consideration.
24. Alternatively, Mr Juma asserted he is entitled to set-off against any liability to the Claimant, the Claimant's liabilities to MARJ.
25. For the reasons published on 20 November 20231I found:
(a) The Defendants had no real prospect of successfully defending the debt claim against them because:
(i) the outstanding balance of MARJ’s account is due and payable by MARJ to the Claimant;
(ii) the Defendants are not entitled to set-off any damages they suffered as a result of the Claimant breaching the alleged implied terms or regulatory obligations against the amounts owing to the Claimant under the Facility Agreement;
(iii) the Defendants have no real prospect of establishing the existence of the alleged implied terms or that the Claimant breached those alleged implied terms and hence of succeeding on their counterclaim; and
(iv) the Guarantee is enforceable against Mr Juma.
(b) There is no other compelling reason why the Claimant’s debt claim or its claim against Mr Juma under the Guarantee should be disposed of at a trial.
(c) The Claimant's application for immediate judgment should be granted.
(d) Judgment on the debt claim should be entered for the Claimant against each of the Defendants in the amount of USD 55,884,582.50.
Claimant’s application for costs orders
26. The Claimant seeks orders:
(a) That the Defendants must pay the Claimant’s costs of and occasioned by the claim (i.e. the Case) and of the Immediate judgment Application on an indemnity basis.
(b) The Defendants are liable on a joint and several basis to pay the costs set out in paragraph 26(a) above.
(c) The Defendants shall pay Al Tamimi & Co (on behalf of the Claimant) the sum of AED 717,108 by way of an interim payment on account pursuant to PD 5/2014, within 14 days of this order.
(d) The Claimant’s costs shall be assessed by way of detailed assessment if not agreed.
Costs Framework
27. RDC Part 38.6 provides that the relevant approach to be adopted on any application for costs is as follows:
(a) to determine whether costs are payable by one party to another;
(b) to determine the amount of these costs; and
(c) to determine when the costs are to be paid.
Defendants must pay Claimant’s costs of Immediate Judgment Application
28. The general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party2.
29. The Claimant was the successful party. There is no reason for departing from the general rule. The Defendants must pay the Claimant's costs of the Immediate Judgement Application.
Defendants must pay the Claimant’s costs of the Case excluding the misrepresentation claim
30. The Claimant submits that the general rule ought to apply to the Claimant’s claim – the Defendants should pay the Claimant’s costs of the Case.
31. The Claimant submits3:
(a) The Claimant was successful in its claim and application for immediate judgment, and it is the clear winner of the litigation.
(b) An order that the Defendants pay the Claimant’s costs reflect the “overall justice of the case”.
(c) In circumstances where none of the Defendants’ pleaded defences or counterclaims were held to have any prospect of success, the identity of the successful party can only be deemed to be the Claimant, and “real weight” must be given to the overall success of the Claimant.
32. The Defendants submit that the Claimant cannot be awarded the costs of the entire claim at this stage because there are issues which remain to be decided. The Claimant has not applied for immediate judgment on its misrepresentation claim and that claim remains open for trial and determination.
33. At [5] – [64] and [66] – [68] of its Particulars of Claim, the Claimant pleads the debt claim based on its entitlement to demand repayment at any time and on MARJ committing events of default under the Facilities Agreement including failure to provide valid and effective security in the form of the Bonds, and the misrepresentations as to the Bonds.
34. At [65] the Claimant pleads the misrepresentation claim:
“Further and alternatively, the Claimant has suffered loss and damage as a result of the misrepresentations as to the Bonds in that it was induced to provide the Facilities without the effective security which was to be provided by the Bonds.”
35. When a claimant pleads a separate claim “further and alternatively”, they are essentially asserting two legal causes of action in the same case.
36. The Claimant pleads it has suffered loss and damage as a result of the misrepresentations in that it was induced to provide the Facilities without the effective security which was to be provided by the Bonds. The Claimant does not particularise the loss and damage it claims to have suffered as a result of the pleaded misrepresentation.
37. However, in its prayer for relief the Claimant claims damages for misrepresentation against MARJ as well as, not in the alternative to, the amount it claims in debt against MARJ and Mr Juma.
38. The Claimant has obtained judgment on the debt claim, but the misrepresentation claim has not been disposed of. The Claimant may still pursue the misrepresentation claim, and if it does the Court will make a separate determination on that claim.
39. In these circumstances the Claimant should not have the costs of the misrepresentation claim which remains to be determined.
40. In deciding what order to make about costs the Court must have regard to all the circumstances including whether the Claimant has succeeded on part of its case even if it has not been wholly successful4.
41. Success is not a technical term but a result in real life.
42. The reality of the case is that the Claimant has succeeded on its principal claim and has obtained the principal, and perhaps the whole of, the relief it seeks.
43. The Claimant may or may not pursue the misrepresentation claim. If it does and succeeds it will have succeeded on the whole of the Case and should have the costs of the whole of the Case.
44. Where a winner fights and loses certain issues, an issue based costs award may be appropriate[2008] EWHC 2280 TCC at [72]).">5. The Court will consider the issues on which the parties have succeeded and failed in exercising its discretion. However, there is no automatic rule requiring reduction of a successful party's costs if they lose on one or more issues[2008] 3 Costs LR 427 at [11].">6. If the Claimant pursues the misrepresentation claim and does not succeed, it might or might not be appropriate to award the Defendants the costs of that claim.
45. It is appropriate that at this stage the Claimant should have the costs of the Case but not the separate costs of the misrepresentation claim. The costs of the misrepresentation claim should await the resolution of that claim.
46. The costs orders should reflect the distinction between costs of the case or action and costs of issues. The relevant principles were explained by Justice Dixon in the High Court of Australia inSmith v Madden7,where his honour considered the principles applied by English and Irish courts inMedway Oil and Storage Company, Limited v Continental Contractors, Limited8, Crean v. M'Millan9, and Wilson v. Walters10
47. Justice Dixon held that on the taxation of the costs of an action in which judgment had been given for the plaintiff on the claim with costs and for the defendant on the counterclaim with costs, the claim should be treated as if it stood alone, and the counterclaim should bear only the amount by which the costs of the proceedings have been increased by it. Justice Dixon explained that in an action where the generally successful party had failed on some issues, the successful party recovered his costs of the action, and the unsuccessful party recovered the costs of the issues on which he succeeded only to the extent that those costs were discrete and had added to the costs of the proceeding:
“… at common law apportionment was not practised. If issues were found, some for one party, some for the other, then that party who was considered to have succeeded in the result became entitled to the general costs of the action and the costs of the issues upon which he had nevertheless failed went to his adversary. In the common law courts in such circumstances, upon a taxation, the party entitled to the general costs of the action received all the costs necessarily or reasonably incurred in order to enable him to achieve the success in result and the party entitled to the costs of the issues on which the former had failed received only the extra costs caused to him by the inclusion of those issues.”11
48. Justice Dixon applied the common law rule which distinguished the costs of the action from the costs of issues to the situation where one party was awarded the costs of the action and the other party the costs of a counterclaim.
49. Later in his judgement Justice Dixon explained the difference between mixed costs, common costs, and costs attributable only to an issue, or, in the case his Honour was considering, a counterclaim:
“But, although there can be no apportionment of items of costs between the two parts of the cause, it may be necessary to divide an item of costs in two parts. This will occur when there is a single charge for work but a severable part of that work relates to the claim and the other severable part of the work relates to the counterclaim. It will then be necessary to divide the single charge in accordance with the two classes of work it covers. Division of charges in this way must be distinguished from apportionment, but it is easy to see that, under cover of division, apportionment in the sense of the Chancery practice may really be applied. The likelihood of a disguised apportionment thus occurring is not lessened by the use of the word 'apportion' to describe the division necessary. Indeed the subject is embarrassed by the ambiguity, generality and indefiniteness of much of the terminology employed in the cases. Some attempt, however, has been made to find more specific terms. Charges which cover without discrimination work referable to the action and work referable to the counterclaim have been called 'mixed' by O'Connor LJ in James Crean & Son Ltd v M'Millan in the course of a judgment which has been referred to with approval more than once: see particularly per Lord Haldane in the Medway Oil & Storage Co's Case, and per Scrutton LJ in Wilson v Walters. An example of such a mixed item is a fee of a pleader for drawing the defence and counterclaim or drawing a reply that includes a defence to a counterclaim. Such a fee covers work that belongs to the claim and severable work that belongs to the counterclaim. In contrast to such mixed items, there are items that serve as much the purpose of the claim as the counterclaim. These are 'common' items. Thus, the costs of witnesses whose evidence relates to an issue arising both on the claim and on the counterclaim would be a common item and so would be an attendance to enter the cause, to obtain an adjournment, to hear judgment and so on. But there are many items, notably costs incurred in steps in the proceedings before the filing of the counterclaim, which are not common but are incurred only in bringing and maintaining or, in the case of the defendant, in defending the action. Writ, appearance and statement of claim are examples of this class of item. They, of course, all form part of the costs of the action, but so do the common items. The mixed items must, however, be divided and a proper part attributed to so much of the work covered by the charges as belongs to the counterclaim and the rest to the action. O'Connor LJ has pointed out that it is possible that a charge or item may cover some work belonging to the claim, some work belonging to the counterclaim and some that is common to both. In such a case the division should be of the amount properly attributable to the work relating to the counterclaim from that representing the work with reference to the claim and from the work common to both. The two latter form part of the costs of the action “12
50. The Claimant will be the successful party, whatever the outcome of the misrepresentation claim. The principal issue in the proceeding between the Claimant and MARJ is whether the Claimant should recover from MARJ the outstanding amount advanced under the Facilities together with interest. The Claimant has succeeded on that issue. The only issue between the Claimant and Mr Juma is whether the Claimant can recover those amounts from Mr Juma under the Guarantee. The Claimant has succeeded on that issue.
51. The order for costs should recognise that whilst the Claimant succeeded in the Case on the whole, it raised an issue - the misrepresentation claim - which has not been resolved and on which it might fail and which increased the costs of the proceeding, It is not appropriate to order that the Defendants have the costs of that issue at this time because the issue has not been resolved.
52. The appropriate order is that the Defendants jointly and severally pay to the Claimant:
(a) its costs of the Immediate Judgment Application; and
(b) its costs of the Case except the extra costs caused to the Claimant by the misrepresentation claim.
Basis of assessment
53. The Claimant contends that its costs should be payable on the indemnity basis.
54. In deciding what order to make about costs, the Court must have regard to all the circumstances, including (1) the conduct of the parties; (2) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue; and (3) the manner in which a party has pursued its case13
55. The Court has a wide discretion to award costs on an indemnity basis where the circumstances justify such an award.
56. Practice Direction No.5 of 2014 provides that in determining whether costs should be assessed on the indemnity basis the Court should take into account, amongst other things, in the exercise of its discretion:
“(i) circumstances where the facts of the case and/or the conduct of the paying party are/is such as to take the situation away from the norm; for example where the Court has found deliberate misconduct in breach of a direction of the Court or unreasonable conduct to a high degree in connection with the litigation; or
(ii) otherwise inappropriate conduct in its wider sense in relation to a paying party’s pre-litigation dealings with the receiving party, or in relation to the commencement or conduct of the litigation itself; or
(iii) where the Court considers the paying party’s conduct to be an abuse of process.”
57. The Practice Direction reflects the approach of English courts to the award of indemnity costs. InExcelsior Commercial v Salisbury Hamer[2002] EWCA Civ 879,">14, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that, for costs to be awarded on the indemnity basis pursuant to CPR 44, there has to be something in the conduct of the action or the circumstances of the case which takes that case "out of the norm". In that case it had been legitimate to award costs on the indemnity basis because the claimant had made a speculative claim and been awarded only nominal damages at trial, whereas the defendant had made numerous attempts to settle the matter without recourse to the court and a substantial Part 36 offer one day before trial.
58. Although it is always a matter for the court's discretion, case law shows that indemnity costs are often ordered when there is some culpability or abuse of process on the part of the party who has to pay costs. Generally, when considering an application for the award of costs on the indemnity basis, the court is concerned, principally, with the losing (paying) party's conduct of the case, rather than the substantive merits of that party's position. The fact that a party advanced and pursued a weak case is not usually sufficient alone to justify indemnity costs. To justify an indemnity order, the litigant's conduct must amount to misconduct deserving moral condemnation or be unreasonable to a high degree and not just be wrong or misguided in hindsight[2001] EWCA Civ 933; Simms v Law Society [2005] EWCA Civ 849; Healy-Upright v Bradley and another [2007] EWHC 3161">15
59. In ArcadiaGroup Brands Ltd v Visa Inc[2015] EWCA Civ 883">16the claimants' claims failed as they were statute-barred but an indemnity costs order was overturned on appeal. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that the weakness of a legal argument was not, without more, justification for an indemnity basis of costs, which is in its nature penal. The position might be different if proceedings or steps taken within them were not only based on a plainly hopeless case but were motivated by some ulterior commercial or personal purpose or otherwise for purely tactical reasons unconnected with any real belief in their merit.
60. InEasyair Limited v Opal Telecom Limited[2009] EWHC 779">17, Opal had successfully applied to strike out the majority of claims against it by Easyair. In declining to award indemnity costs Lewison J said:
“The fact that a substantial part of a case has failed at the stage of summary judgment does not warrant an award of indemnity costs. The whole point of summary procedures is to stop hopeless cases from going to trial. The giving of summary judgment against a party who has a hopeless case is itself the norm.”
61. The Claimant referred toMAG Financial Services LLC v. Theron Entertainment LLC18where the Court had regard to the absence of any proper evidential basis for the claim and its dependence on an unsustainable contention as to the construction of relevant instruments.
62. The Claimant says that the Defendants ran almost every possible defence and a counterclaim in a hopeless and transparent attempt to avoid immediate judgment, alleging numerous breaches of purported implied terms and reckless or negligent breaches of regulatory rules. The Claimant submits fairly:
“the Judgment is replete with findings that there is ‘no evidence’ to support the Defendants ‘allegations, no evidence of any breach of a Braganza type duty, no evidence of a breach of an implied duty of good faith, no evidence that the Claimant prevented the Defendants from transferring the account, no evidence that there is a statutory requirement under Singapore law for a deed to be witnessed and finally, no evidence that the Defendants suffered any of the alleged loss or damage they complained of.”
63. I am not persuaded that the Defendants defended the debt claim including the claim under the Guarantee with a culpable motive or improper purpose or otherwise such as to amount to an abuse.
64. I am not persuaded that the Defendants’ case was so hopeless that it amounts to unreasonable conduct taking the case outside the norm and justifying an award of indemnity costs. Costs should be assessed on the standard basis.
The Amount of Costs Payable
65. Where the Court orders a party to pay costs to another party it may either make an immediate assessment of the costs or order detailed assessment of the costs19.
66. The parties have filed statements of costs as follows:
(a) MARJ - on 11 October 2023 - AED 376,616.77.
(b) Claimant - 10 October 2023 - AED 1,195,181.02
67. The Claimant contends that the amount of costs payable should be determined by a detailed cost assessment, unless agreed.
68. The Defendants object to the statement of costs filed by the Claimant. First, the Defendants say that the Claimant’s statement of costs includes work done in relation to the entire Case, the Claimant can only claim costs for the Immediate Judgment Application because the entire Case has not been disposed of, and accordingly the Claimant’s statement of costs should be rejected. Secondly, the Defendants object to items of the Claimant’s statement of costs. For example, the Defendants say that fee earners have repeat entries with different rates and times and many items of work are not justified. The Defendants submit that by the Claimant’s own submission this is not a complex matter, but a simple debt recovery case and it would be disproportionate to award the amount of costs signed by the Claimant.
69. In the circumstances the appropriate order is an order for detailed assessment of the amount of costs payable by the Defendants to the Claimant.
Interim payment on account of costs
70. Where the Court has ordered a party to pay costs, it may order an amount to be paid on account before the costs are assessed20. Practice direction No. 5 of 2014 [5] provides:
“Where the Court has ordered a party to pay costs subject to detailed assessment unless agreed, it will order 50% of the amount claimed in the statement of costs to be paid on account before the costs are assessed, unless the Court sees fit to order otherwise.”
71. It is common practice in the DIFC Courts, as in other Courts exercising a commercial jurisdiction, to recognise that a party who has obtained the benefit of an order for costs in his favour should not be kept out of his money longer than is necessary “whilst the process of assessment grinds through”.21
72. The guiding consideration in such a case is to seek to limit the amount of the interim payment to an amount which is not greater than that which will be obtained on assessment. The amount to be awarded should be the “best estimate that [a judge] can make, with caution in mind, on the material that is available.”22
73. As I have noted above, the Claimant filed a statement of costs prior to the immediate judgment hearing which set out its costs of the entire Case, in the amount of AED 1,195,181.02. I have determined that the Defendants should pay not the whole of the Claimant’s costs of the Case but rather the Claimant’s costs of the Case except the extra costs caused to the Claimant by the misrepresentation claim. Also, the Defendants have raised objections to particular items in the Claimant’s statement of costs and that the costs claimed are disproportionate to the nature and complexity of the case.
74. The appropriate order is that the Defendants pay the Claimant AED 500,000 by way of an interim payment on account.
Time for complying with order for costs
75. A party must comply with an order for the payment of costs within 14 days of the date off the order if it states the amount of those costs or such later date as the court may specify23.
76. The Claimant submits that the interim payment on account of costs should be paid within 14 days of the Court’s order. There is no material before the Court and no reason has been advanced why the Court should specify a later date for the payment off the interim costs than the date specified in the Rules.
Conclusion
77. The appropriate exercise of discretion is to order:
(a) The Defendants jointly and severally pay the Claimant’s costs of the Immediate Judgment Application to be assessed by a detailed assessment of the costs by the Registrar if not agreed.
(b) The Defendants jointly and severally pay the Claimant’s costs of the Case except the extra costs caused by the misrepresentation claim to be assessed by a detailed assessment of the costs by the Registrar if not agreed.
(c) The Defendants pay the Claimant the sum of AED 500,000 by way of an interim payment on account, within 14 days of the date of the issue of the Court’s Order.