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Cite as: [1930] UKHL 2

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JISCBAILII_CASE_TAX

    Die Lunae, 15° Decembris, 1930.

    Parliamentary Archives,
    HL/PO/JU/4/3/846

    Lord
    Buck-
    master.

    Viscount
    Dunedin.

    Lord War-
    rington of
    Clyffe.

    Lord

    Tomlin

    Lord

    Thanker-
    ton.

    ARCHER-SHEE

    v.
    GARLAND (INSPECTOR OF TAXES).

    Lord Buckmaster.

    MY LORDS,

    The Appellant is, by General Rule 16 of the Income Tax Acts,
    assessable to income tax in respect of the profits of his wife. Her
    father was a citizen of the United States of America, and under
    his will, made in New York, she is entitled to receive during her
    life the income of his residuary estate which is held at present by
    the Trust Company of New York as Executor and Trustee of the
    will. Part of such monies are remitted to this country by the
    Trustee and about these no question is raised, but part remain in
    New York and the liability of the Appellant to have these retained
    monies assessed for income tax is the sole question on this appeal.

    The early history of the case and all material facts are to be
    found in 1927 A.C., p. 844, which1 contains the report of the
    decision when the same dispute as the present was considered by
    this House under different circumstances. The explanation of why,
    notwithstanding that decision, this case is again presented to your
    Lordships lies in the fact that the will of the Appellant's father-
    in law under which the property passed was then construed accord-
    ing to English law, and, so regarded, it was held that the interest
    of the Appellant's wife was derived from stocks, shares or funds
    outside the United Kingdom and therefore by Rule 1 of Case 5 was
    assessable to Income Tax whether received here or not. The question
    as to what might happen if the American law differed from the
    English was left open. Such decision covered the claims up to
    April 1925, but since then three assessments have been made in
    accordance with the law then laid down, and these are the assess-
    ments now in dispute. It is obvious, therefore, for the Appellant
    to succeed he must show that the American law differs in a crucial
    respect from the law of England, and that the former judgment
    has accordingly lost its force, and this he now claims to have done.

    His contention was accepted by the Commissioners and Rowlatt
    J., but not by the Court of Appeal who, with the dissent of
    Greer L.J., once more found against the Appellant.

    To make the point now in issue quite plain it is necessary again
    to refer to the Statute and the Rules.

    Under Schedule D. 1, a tax is charged in respect of—

    (a) " The annual profits or gains arising or accruing

    " (i) to any person residing in the United King-
    ' dom from any kind of property whatever whether
    " situate in the United Kingdom or elsewhere."

    This general provision is then separated into six different cases
    under which the tax is to be charged, the fourth and fifth of which
    are the ones relevant to this appeal. They are as follows :—

    " Case IV. Tax in respect of income arising from
    " securities out of the United Kingdom except such income as
    " is charged under Schedule C.

    " Case V. Tax in respect of income arising from posses-
    " sions out of the United Kingdom."

    2 [2]

    Except that these two cases appear to overlap, the matter seems
    so far clear, but the mists begin to fall when the rules are exam-
    ined, " subject to and in accordance with which " the tax is to be
    charged, for it is then found that two distinct methods of computa-
    tion and two distinct liabilities apply to different classes of property
    under these two rules.

    It will be noticed that Case IV applies only to what are called

    " securities ", and Rule 1 under it provides that the tax is in that

    case to be " computed on the full amount thereof arising in the

    " year of assessment whether the income has been or will, be received

    " in the United Kingdom or not ", and this differs from the rules

    under Case V, which create the present difficulties. The rules in

    question are 1 and 2, and their material portions are as follows :—

    " 1.—The tax in respect of income arising from stocks,

    ' shares or rents in any place out of the United Kingdom shall

    ' be computed on the full amount thereof on an average of the

    ' three preceding years, as directed in Case I, whether the

    ' income has been or will be received in the United Kingdom

    ' or not. . . .

    " 2.—The tax in respect of income arising from posses-
    " sions out of the United Kingdom, other than stocks, shares
    " or rents, shall be computed on the full amount of the actual
    " sums annually received in the United Kingdom from remit-
    " tances payable in the United Kingdom ... on an average
    " of the three preceding years as directed in Case I, without
    " any deduction or abatement other than is therein allowed."

    If, therefore, the income in this case is income " arising from
    " stocks, shares or rents ", it must be computed on a three years'
    average, and is liable to be taxed whether received in the United
    Kingdom or no, but if it is not it is still computed on a three years'
    average but only " on the full amount of the actual sums annually
    " received in the United Kingdom."

    It is not for us to enquire into the reason for this change; we
    assume a reason to exist, and that it is wise and just. We are
    concerned only with whether Rule 1 or Rule 2 applies. That when
    this matter was formerly raised Rule 1 applied was determined by
    this House by Wrenbury, Carson and Atkinson LL., Sumner and
    Blanesburgh LL. dissenting. Lord Wrenbury's judgment was ex-
    pressly concurred in by Lord Atkinson, who added no further
    reasons of his own.

    It is, therefore, extremely important to see why Lord Wrenbury
    and Carson L. formed this opinion, and the report enables this to
    be accurately determined. Wrenbury L. at page 866 says :—

    ' Lady Archer-Shee (if American law is the same as Eng-
    " lish Law) is, in my opinion, as matter of construction of the
    " will, entitled in equity specifically during her life to the
    " dividends upon the stocks,"

    and on the same page he repeats this conclusion again made de-
    pendent upon the hypothesis of the identity of the law in the two
    countries. He there says :—

    ' It is, I think, if the law of America is the same as our
    '' law, an equitable right in possession to receive during her
    '' life the proceeds of the shares and stocks of which she is
    " tenant for life."

    Lord Carson, at p. 870, supports the same opinion in these words :
    " Upon the construction of the will of Alfred Pell once the
    " residue had become specifically ascertained the Respondent's
    " wife was sole beneficial owner of the interest and dividends
    " of all the stocks and shares forming part of the trust fund."
    Now the construction of the will was there the construction ac-
    cording to English law, the principles and effect of which bad

    [3] 3

    been enunciated by Wrenbury L. This opinion was not in accord-
    ance with that of Sumner L. who supported the judgment of
    Sargant L. J. in the Court of Appeal where he said this :—

    " What this lady enjoys is not the stocks, shares and rents

    " or other property constituting the trust, fund under the will;

    " what she has is the right to call upon the trustees, and, if

    " necessary, to compel the trustees to administer this property

    " during her life so as to give her the income arising there from

    " according to the provisions of the trust. Her interest is

    " merely an equitable one, and it is not an interest in the specific

    " stocks and shares constituting the trust fund at all."

    This was the opposite view to that held in this House, and it

    was as because it was decided that it did not define accurately Lady

    Archer-Shee's position under the will according to English law that

    the decision was given in favour of the Crown.

    The evidence of two American lawyers has now been given in the
    matter on behalf of the Appellant and no one has been called to
    contradict their statements.

    Mr. Richard Powell, a Professor of Law at Columbia University
    Law School in the City of New York, stated that the provision
    of the law which directs who shall hold and own the property of a
    trust was as follows:—

    " Every express trust valid as such in its creation, except

    " as herein otherwise provided, shall vest the whole estate in

    " the trustees in law, and in equity, subject only to the execu-

    " tion of the trust period. The persons for whose benefit the

    " trust is created shall take no estate or interest in the lands,

    " but may enforce the performance of the trust in equity."

    This provision, although it relates in terms only to lands, had

    been held to be equally applicable to personal property, and again

    he said " that Lady Archer-Shee had no right to any specific divi-

    "dends or interest at all," and he explained her rights in these

    words: —

    " While it was true that under the trust in question (there

    " being no provision for accumulation) the whole of the net

    " income (including in the event of death any income accrued

    " but not paid over) must ultimately be either paid over to or

    " applied for the benefit of Lady Archer-Shee, the manner and

    " times of doing so were within the discretion of the trustees

    " subject to judicial supervision; that if the Trustees exercised

    " their discretion unconscientiously. Lady Archer-Shee had the

    " right to ask the Court to supervise their behaviour in the

    " matter both of the management of the income and of the

    " capital of the Trust."

    This opinion was confirmed by a member of a legal firm of old
    standing in New York, and is uncontradicted.

    The M.R. thinks that the latter part of the statement I have
    quoted " in essentials appears to accord with the statements " of
    Wrenbury L. The same question often presents itself to different
    minds under different aspects; to my mind the statement which
    must be taken with the other words I have quoted differs in every
    essential from Wrenbury L.'s views. At its highest it does no
    more than express what Sargant L.J. thought, but erroneously,
    was the English law, and it was this that Wrenbury L. rejected.

    I cannot reconcile the statement of the American

    lawyer that Lady Archer-Shee had "no right to any specific divi-

    " dends or interest at all " with the statement of Lord Wrenbury

    that she was " entitled in equity specifically during her

    " life to the dividends upon the stocks." Nor, again, can

    I reconcile the statement that she took " no estate or interest '

    in the funds, though she might enforce the performance

    of the trust in equity with the statement of Lord Carson that under

    4 [4]

    English law she was sole beneficial owner of the interest and divi-
    dends of all the stocks and shares.

    In my opinion the difference between the two systems of law
    cannot be better explained than by contrasting the Judgments of
    Sumner and Blanesburgh LL. in the House of Lords, and that of
    Sargant L. J. in the Court of Appeal with that of Lords Wrenbury,
    Carson, and Atkinson which there prevailed. These former learned
    Judges were held to have imperfectly enunciated the English Law,
    but they have expressed with perfect clearness what we now know
    is the American Law which is the law we are bound to apply.

    This to my mind ends the case but the Attorney-General pressed
    on us with such insistence the case of Williams c. Singer, 1919 2.
    K.B. 108 1921 A.C. that I feel some comment is necessary.

    In that case the trustees of an English settlement were domi-
    ciled in this country but the tenant for life was a French subject
    by marriage and domiciled abroad.

    The income of the settled fund was paid under orders of the
    trustees direct to the tenant for life at a Bank in New York.

    In those circumstances assessments were made on the trustees
    and these assessments were set aside by this House. One sentence
    from the judgment of Cave L.C. will serve to show how little
    to the present purpose is the consideration of that authority. He
    says, p. 72: " The object of the acts is to secure for the State a
    " proportion of the profits chargeable, and this end is attained,
    " speaking generally, by the simple and effective process of taxing
    " the profits where they are found. If the beneficiary received
    " them he is liable to be assessed upon them. If the trustee
    " receives and controls them he is primarily so liable." The case
    of Syme v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue
    1914 AC 1013 again
    ,is no assistance. The tax was there assessed upon income " derived
    " by any person from personal exertion ' and this was by the
    statute declared to include " income arising or accruing from any
    " trade " although not arisen from the taxpayer's own personal
    exertion or trade. Under the provisions of a will trustees carried
    on a business and paid the Appellant one fifth of the profits and on
    these the tax was held duly assessed under the provisions already
    quoted. It is rarely profitable to attempt the interpretation of one
    statute by another and in this case the mere comparison of the
    language shows it to be useless. The former decision in the case
    shows that an absolute ownership of the stocks, shares and divi-
    dends is not necessary; a limited ownership is sufficient to satisfy
    the rule, but it shows also that such ownership must be specific
    in relation to the subject, and the opinion on which we are bound
    to act shows that is not the true position of Lady Archer-Shee. For
    these reasons I think this appeal should be allowed.

    Lord
    Back-

    master.

    Viscount

    Dunedin.

    Lord

    Warring-
    ton of
    Clyffe.

    Lord

    Tomlin.

    Lord

    Thanker-
    ton.

    [5]

    ARCHER-SHEE

    v.
    GARLAND (Inspector of Taxes).

    Viscount Dunedin.

    MY LORDS,

    The first and indeed crucial point of this case is to make up
    one's mind as to what was the true ratio decidendi in the former
    case as to the same source of income in this House, for by that
    decision we are bound. I think the ratio decidendi very clearly
    appears by comparing the judgment of Viscount Sumner, who
    was in the minority, with the majority judgment which prevailed.
    Viscount Sumner thought that the specific property in the stocks,
    shares, securities, and other investments which formed the Trust
    Fund, was in the hands of the Trustees, and that accordingly
    what the beneficiary in this country got was what came to her
    from a foreign possession, namely, her right to get the Trustees
    to make payment to her of the balance of the income. That view
    was rejected by the majority on the view that there was in the
    beneficiary a specific and equitable interest in each and every one
    of the stocks, shares, etc. which formed the Trust Fund, and that
    the case fell either under Case IV, or, in so far as the funds
    consisted of stocks and shares, under Rule I of Case V, and they
    remitted the case to find out the exact constituents of the Fund.
    That case was decided without enquiry as to the law of New York.
    It is obvious that the judgment of the majority turns upon an
    assumption that the law of New York is what they declared the
    English law to be.

    Now, in the present case, the law of New York has been
    enquired into, and we have heard the testimony of the lawyers
    examined. In face of that testimony it seems to me quite an
    impossibility to hold that, according to that law, there is a specific
    equitable interest in the beneficiary in each parcel of securities,
    stocks, etc. The interest of the beneficiary is just what Viscount
    Sumner thought it was in the former case. Accordingly I think
    the appeal must be allowed and the judgment of Rowlatt J.
    restored, for the income of Lady Archer-Shee is drawn from a
    foreign possession and falls under Rule 2 of Case V.

    Lord

    Buck-

    master.

    Viscount
    Dunedin.

    Lord
    Warring-
    ton.

    Lord
    Tomlin.

    Lord

    Thanker-

    ton.

    [6]

    ARCHER SHEE


    v.

    GARLAND (INSPECTOR OF TAXES).

    Lord Tomlin.

    MY LORDS,

    The answer to the question which falls to be determined on this
    appeal depends in my opinion first upon the effect of the decision in
    your Lordships' House in Baker v. Archer Shee
    1927 AC 844 and
    secondly upon the conclusion as to American Law to be drawn from
    the evidence of the American lawyers.

    I do not think it can be doubted that the majority of your Lord-
    ships' House in the former case, founded themselves upon the view
    that according to English law (with which, in that case, American
    law was assumed to be identical) the Appellant's wife had a pro-
    perty interest in the income arising from the securities stocks and
    shares constituting the American trust and that but for the exist
    ence of that supposed property interest the decision would have
    been different.

    The evidence upon American Law adduced before the Commis-
    sioners in the present case contains statements to the effect that the
    whole estate in law and in equity in the trust funds is vested in the
    trustees and that the words of the Trust give to the Appellant's wife
    merely the right to resort to a Court of equity to compel the trustees
    to discharge the task imposed upon them which was to apply the
    money which they receive as a net income from the trust to her use,
    that they have within the limits of reasonable and conscientious
    behaviour an absolute discretion as to the application of the income
    for her benefit, that if they decided to apply the money for her
    benefit instead of paying it over they must exercise the power to do
    so reasonably, and that she had no right to any specific dividends or
    interest at all.

    In the face of these statements I think the finding of fact must
    necessarily be that according to American law the Appellant's
    wife has no property interest in the income arising from the securi-
    ties stocks and shares constituting the trust fund but has only a
    chose in action available against the trustees.

    Applying the principle of the previous decision of your Lord-
    ships' House to the case with the fact as to American law found
    as I have indicated it should in my opinion be found, I reach the
    conclusion that the assessable income, the subject of the appeal, is
    income arising from a possession out of the United Kingdom other
    than stocks shares or rents, viz. a chose in action available against
    the American trustees and that the assessment should be made not
    under Case IV and Case V rule 1 of Schedule D but under Case V
    rule 2 of that Schedule.

    The appeal therefore in my opinion succeeds.

    Lord Thankerton.

    MY LORDS,

    I concur in your Lordships' opinion.

    Lord Buckmaster.

    MY LORDS,

    My noble and learned friend Lord Warrington of Clyffe has
    asked me to say that he agrees with the judgment which I have
    read.

    (8916-50) Wt 31908-34 14 12/30 P.St. G311


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