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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Miah, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 465 (01 April 2025)
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2025/465.html
Cite as: [2025] EWCA Crim 465

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWCA Crim 465
Case No 2024/03235/B2

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT CHELMSFORD
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE MILLS) [42MR1189824]

Royal Courts of Justice
The Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
1 April 2025

B e f o r e :


LORD JUSTICE WARBY
MR JUSTICE BRYAN
HIS HONOUR JUDGE ANDREW LEES
(Sitting as a Judge of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division)

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REX

- v -

MAMUNROSHID MIAH

____________________

Non Counsel Application
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A P P R O VE D HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
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Crown Copyright ©

    MR JUSTICE BRYAN:

  1. On 1 March 2024, in the Crown Court at Chelmsford before His Honour Judge Richard Wilkin, the applicant, then aged 34, pleaded guilty to two counts of breach of a Sexual Harm Prevention Order (counts 2 and 3).
  2. On 12 August 2024, following a trial in the Crown Court at Chelmsford before His Honour Judge Alexander Mills and a jury, the applicant was convicted of one count of false imprisonment (count 1) and of two counts of assault by beating (counts 4 and 5).
  3. On 14 August 2024, before the same court, the applicant was sentenced to 20 months' imprisonment in respect of count 1 (false imprisonment), to a consecutive term of 16 months' imprisonment in respect of count 2 (breach of the Sexual Harm Prevention Order), to a concurrent term of 16 months' imprisonment on count 3 (the second breach of the Sexual Harm Prevention Order), and to concurrent terms of seven days' imprisonment on each of counts 4 and 5 (the assaults by beating). The total sentence was 36 months' imprisonment.
  4. The applicant renews his application for leave to appeal against conviction following a refusal by the single judge.
  5. We turn to the facts in relation to the convictions. The applicant (who was born on 25 September 1989), and Complainant 1 (who was born on 7 February 2007) had been in a relationship since September 2023, when the applicant was aged 34 and Complainant 1 was aged 16. Complainant 1's father did not approve of the relationship and, as a result, when she saw the applicant, she would keep it a secret from her father. On 28 January 2024, she told her father that she was visiting a friend, but instead met with the applicant and went to his home address.
  6. At around 11 pm on 28 January 2024, having missed the last bus home, Complainant 1 used her mobile telephone to call for a taxi to take her home. The applicant asked for her phone and spoke to the driver. He cancelled the booking, promising that he would contact a different taxi company because he believed that the fare was too expensive.
  7. The applicant had Complainant 1's mobile telephone in his pocket and, as the evening drew on, she asked the applicant to return her phone. She tried to leave the applicant's bedroom, but he refused to let her leave by taking her coat and blocking the doorway.
  8. She tried for over two hours to leave the applicant's address but then accepted that she would have to stay and fell asleep (count 1). When the applicant returned her phone the next morning, she had received several missed calls and text messages from friends and family. She messaged her friend and made arrangements to meet her at the local Co-Op store. Once there, she was taken into the manager's office and the police were called. The police were unable to speak to the applicant as he had left the store before the police arrived.
  9. Complainant 2 is a friend of Complainant 1 and, after the events of January 2024, she made a complaint to police that the applicant had assaulted her on two occasions. The first was in October or November 2023 whilst with the applicant and Complainant 1 in a room at the rear of the applicant's family's restaurant. It was at around 2 am and Complainant 2 suggested that she and Complainant 1 went home. The applicant grabbed her hair and pulled her close to him in something similar to a headlock (count 4).
  10. The second occasion was some weeks later when the two complainants were with the applicant in the back room of the family restaurant. It was the early hours of the morning and Complainant 2 indicated that she wanted to leave. The applicant grabbed her arm, wrapped his other arm around her shoulders and pulled her into him. She got away from him, but the applicant then grabbed her legs and pulled her towards him (count 5).
  11. The applicant attended Chelmsford Police Station on 1 February 2024 and was interviewed on the same day. He denied the allegations in relation to Complainant 1 and declined to be interviewed in relation to Complainant 2. He accused the police of being racist.
  12. The prosecution case was that the applicant intentionally or recklessly prevented Complainant 1 from leaving his address and assaulted Complainant 2 by putting her in a headlock and grabbing her arm and shoulder.
  13. Complainant 1's father gave evidence. He believed that Complainant 1 was visiting a friend on 28 January 2024 and expected her home by 9 pm. He said that when she did not return home, he started calling her and sending text messages. He said that he did not hear from her until the next morning, 29 January 2024, when they exchanged text messages. When he knew that she was in the Co-Op store, he called "an officer, MOSOVO" with whom he was in contact.
  14. During cross examination, Complainant 1's father was asked about a discussion with Complainant 1 about going to live with her mother in Liverpool in which he replied "due to ongoing other things that were going on, which I can't talk about here apparently".
  15. To prove the case, the prosecution relied on the evidence of Complainant 1, Complainant 1's father, Complainant 2, a woman who met Complainant 1 at the Co-Op store, and CCTV footage of the applicant and Complainant 1 entering the Co-Op store. The prosecution also relied upon mobile phone footage of text messages sent and received by Complainant 1 from her father and her friends.
  16. The defence case was one of denial. The applicant denied taking Complainant 1's mobile telephone and denied blocking doors to prevent her from leaving. The applicant asserted that the allegations by Complainant 2 were untrue and he denied any assault.
  17. The applicant gave evidence. He said that whilst travelling with Complainant 1 to his address, she indicated that she would try to catch the last bus home. He said that she called for a taxi and he spoke to a person called Mas who informed him that there were no taxis available but he would try and get one. The applicant said that Mas indicated that he would get back to them but that if he found a taxi, it would cost around £40. The applicant stated that as he finished the call, Complainant 1 tried to snatch the phone from him and he believed that she was hiding something from him and was disrespecting him. He said that this annoyed him but that he had no intention of keeping the phone or falsely imprisoning her. He said that she fell asleep first and that he fell asleep a few minutes afterwards. The applicant denied doing anything to stop Complainant 1 from leaving his address and stated that she could have left the property at any time via the garage door or by using his keys which were on the side in his bedroom along with her phone.
  18. The issue for the jury in relation to count 1 was whether the applicant intentionally prevented Complainant 1 from exercising freedom of movement from one place to another. The issue for the jury in relation to counts 2 and 3 was whether the applicant applied unlawful force to Complainant 2 and whether the force was intentional or reckless as part of consensual horseplay.
  19. The proposed ground for leave to appeal against conviction which was refused by the single judge but renewed before us, is that the conviction is unsafe as reference to the father having contact at "MOSOVO" together with his statement that apparently he was not allowed to say something could have tainted the jury's impartiality by creating the belief that the applicant was likely to be a convicted sex offender.
  20. "MOSOVO" actually stands for Management of Sexual Offenders and Violent Offenders, a specialised role within the police force focused on the risk assessment and management of individuals associated with sexual or violent offences.
  21. The actual position was that although he had no previous convictions for sex offences, the applicant did have a Sexual Harm Prevention Order in place at the time of his trial.
  22. The ultimate question for the court is whether it is satisfied that the convictions are safe. In this regard the way it was put in the Respondent's Notice that has been served was whether a fair minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility, or real danger, that the jury would be prejudiced against the applicant by wrongly admitted prejudicial information. The question of prejudice must be assessed against the context in which the references were made.
  23. The prosecution submit that there was a single fleeting and oblique reference to MOSOVO. There was no reference or explanation at all about what MOSOVO is. The applicant relies upon the jury being aware of MOSOVO's function and purpose, when even experienced defence counsel who represented the applicant at trial states that he did not. The transcript tends to give the impression that it was the name of the officer. Even if the jury were aware of MOSOVO's function and purpose, there is no specific reference to the applicant being in contact with the MOSOVO officer as a result of any matters relating to the applicant.
  24. No comment was made about the remark at the time by defence counsel and the fact that there was any concern was only raised by the applicant post-conviction. The applicant had ample opportunity to raise any concerns he had with the evidence of Complainant 1's father with his counsel before the jury returned their verdicts. The prosecution submit that the fact that he did not and only did so post-conviction suggests that the applicant had no concerns at the time.
  25. The prosecution submit that equally the statement "well, that would have been because of ongoing other things that were going on, which I can't talk about here apparently" is likewise a fleeting, vague reference with no specific reference to any action on the part of the applicant, let alone anything which would tend to suggest to the jury that the applicant was a convicted sex offender, as the applicant contends.
  26. The prosecution also point out that the fact that there was a disagreeable relationship between the applicant and Complainant 1's father was in evidence before the jury and it is more likely that they would have taken the reference to "other things that were going on" as a reference to this background. This included evidence given by the applicant himself that he had experienced "difficulties" with Complainant 1's father. When asked by his counsel: "Did you get the impression that her father was happy with your relationship or not?", the applicant told the jury that he was not happy and informed the jury that her father liked to "chuck his weight about" and suggested that he was homophobic.
  27. Again, no concerns were raised regarding the father's evidence that there were "other things going on" at the time by defence counsel, and the line of cross-examination about threatening to send his daughter to live in Liverpool, which prompted the remark now complained of, was continued.
  28. Overall, it is submitted by the prosecution that a fair minded and informed observer would not have concluded that there was a real danger that the jury would be of the belief that the applicant was a convicted sex offender as a result of the two aspects of the father's evidence and that the conviction is safe.
  29. Discussion

  30. Having had careful regard to the evidence that was given by Complainant 1's father, and the two aspects of it about which complaint is made, like the single judge before us, we are satisfied that a fair minded and informed observer would not have concluded that there was a real danger that the jury would be of the belief that the applicant was a convicted sex offender as a result of the two aspects of the father's evidence and in such circumstances the convictions were not arguably unsafe.
  31. The sole proposed ground of appeal is that evidence from Complainant 1's father may have inadvertently caused the jury to believe that the applicant was a registered sex offender, because when asked whether he called the police, he said that he called an officer at MOSOVO with whom he was in contact and, at one point, he indicated that there was something that he was not allowed to say.
  32. However, the fleeting reference to "MOSOVO" was in response to a question of whether he had called the police, to which he said: "I called an officer, MOSOVO, who I was in contact with". We are satisfied that the ordinary and natural meaning of such a statement is that the police officer was called Mosovo, and that this evidence would have been so understood.
  33. Equally, the second reference was in the context of a question about Complainant 1 being sent to Liverpool with her mother, to which her father responded: "Well, that would have been because of ongoing things that were going on, which I can't talk about here apparently". We are satisfied that this was no more than a fleeting reference that had no apparent link to any previous sexual offence, or indeed to MOSOSVO itself.
  34. It is also notable that no contemporary compliant was made at the time about either aspect of the father's evidence, and indeed defence counsel were themselves unaware of what MOSOVO stood for, which comes as no surprise to us, as we do not understand such an acronym to be widely known.
  35. In such circumstances, we are satisfied that a fair minded and informed observer would not have concluded that there was a real danger that the jury would be of the belief that the applicant was a convicted sex offender as a result of the two aspects of the father's evidence and that in such circumstances the convictions were not arguably unsafe.
  36. We accordingly refuse the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction.
  37. _________________________________


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URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2025/465.html