CO/4322/2014 
Neutral Citation Number: [2014] EWHC 4422 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand
London WC2A 2LL 
 
Friday 21 November 2014 
 
B e f o r e: 

MR JUSTICE BLAKE

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Between: 
BLISKOWSKI 
Appellant 
v 

CIRCUIT COURT IN OPOLE 
Respondent 
 
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Computer‑Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of  
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The Appellant appeared in person ( with the assistance of interpreter for translation purposes)

Miss Catherine Brown appeared on behalf of the Respondent
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J U D G M E N T
1.	MR JUSTICE BLAKE:  This is an appeal from the decision of the Chief Magistrate given on 11 September 2014 ordering the appellant's extradition to Poland on a conviction warrant for drug offences committed between 2002 and 2004 for which he has a two‑year sentence effectively to serve.  He failed to report to prison to serve his sentence in 2001 and came to the United Kingdom in breach of his obligations in the Polish penal process.  He was accordingly found to be a fugitive from justice.  
2.	Three points were taken on his behalf below.  The first point was that the application was an abuse of process because the Polish authorities had presented an amended warrant and withdrawn an earlier one.  The second point was that because in the arrest warrant reference was made to the 2005 statute governing drug offences in Poland that was an application of a retrospective penal provision contrary to Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  The third submission was that extradition would be a disproportionate and unjust interference with the family life that the appellant had established in the United Kingdom since 2007 when he came here with his partner.  
3.	The judge found against all three submissions for reasons that he gave in his judgment, to which I do not need to refer in any detail, but in respect of the retrospective point pointed out that the reference to the sentencing statute was to bring in a more mild sentencing regime rather than a more harsh one, and there was already authority to the point that therefore reference to that subsequent statute after the offence had been committed did not violate the principles of Article 7.  He also found that the presentation of a fresh warrant was not an abuse.  
4.	All those grounds were renewed on the appellant's behalf by his then legal team but they have applied subsequently to come off the record, and so he is unrepresented today.  
5.	The appellant has made brief representations to me in person today in which he has explained that he does not want to go back to Poland, and that he would prefer to serve his sentence here.  He indicates that he thinks he would have problems with former criminal associates or other related persons in Poland who might threaten him and injure him in prison.  That submission tentatively suggests an Article 3 ECHR claim on the basis that his extradition might lead to him being exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment.  
6.	In brief, the fact that he would prefer to serve his sentence in the United Kingdom is not a basis for allowing this appeal.  A high threshold is required before any extradition is blocked by reason of Article 3 of the ECHR.  There must be substantial grounds for fearing a real risk.  Where extradition is to a fellow signatory to the European Convention, who is a member of the Council of Europe and the European Union, there is a presumption of sufficiency of protection both in the prison system and from attacks by third parties. This presumption  will be a sufficient response to any allegation of threats of harm by third parties absent cogent evidence to the contrary that the particular circumstances of a state do not provide or cannot provide sufficient protection from a particular form of harm.  There is no evidence apart from the appellant's own assertion; that is manifestly insufficient to raise this question.  
7.	As regards the Article 8 grounds that were pleaded below and in the notice of appeal, the position is a familiar one.  The appellant has indeed a partner in the United Kingdom, but, as against that, the public interest in extraditing him is a strong one: (1) he is a fugitive from justice and was aware of that when he established his family life here; (2) the offence is not a trivial one and a substantial sentence is to be served; (3) there is no indication of the existence children in the family and child welfare accordingly does not form part of the balance; (4) although there has been some passage of time since 2007, in the context of these cases that is not a lengthy or unusual period; and (5) the public interest in the United Kingdom honouring its obligations in extradition provide a weighty factor.  Cumulatively, they well outweigh any family life claim which may exist in this case.  
8.	The Chief Magistrate, has looked at all the relevant factors and balancing them himself, came to a decision to which he was entitled to come. The test now to be applied is  whether the judge below was wrong.  I am not satisfied that that is the case.  Indeed, he came to the only reasonable decision that would have been open to him.  
9.	This appeal is accordingly dismissed.