Neutral Citation: [2011] QIC (F) 2



In the name of His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar

IN THE CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL COURT OF THE QATAR FINANCIAL CENTRE

16 February 2011

CASE NO: 05/2010

IN	THE	MA	AII	ER	OF	THE		
WI	NDIN	IG	UP	OF	AL	MAL	BANK	LLC

NAZIM OMARA
AND
TAHA BABIKER
Applicant
v.
AL MAL BANK LLC
Respondent
JUDGMENT

Members of the Court:

Justice Dohmann

Justice Lord Cullen

Justice Sackville

ORDERS

The Court **DETERMINES**:

- The freezing Order attached to this judgment and signed by a Justice of the Court, such order to operate until further order of the Court.
- 2. An order that within 14 days of the date hereof, Mr Babiker disclose his assets, verified by affidavit, as stipulated by the attached Order.
- 3. The matter is adjourned until 10 April 2011 in Doha to consider any further applications that may be made by the parties.
- 4. Liberty is granted to the parties to apply on 24 hours written notice.
- 5. Costs are reserved.

JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND AND SUBMISSIONS

- By their application dated 17 December 2010, which was supported by an affidavit of the same date sworn by J K Rolls and accompanied by written submissions by Counsel, the Liquidators applied for a freezing order against the Respondent, Mr Taha Babiker ("Mr Babiker"), as well as for disclosure and restriction of travel orders.
- After a telephone hearing held on 17 December 2010 without notice to Mr Babiker, the Court declined to make any of the orders asked but, by its Order dated 22 December 2010, gave directions for the further conduct of this matter. Mr Babiker's lawyers resist the application and filed submissions in opposition on 10 and 20 January 2011, to which the Liquidators responded on 27 January 2011.
- In support of their application, the Liquidators rely on the Court's judgment in respect of Case 04/2010 dated 1 December 2010 to argue, in effect, that there is a strongly arguable case that Mr Babiker shares responsibility for the losses sustained by Al Mal Bank LLC, as set out in the Amended Points of Counterclaim and Points in support of their Application under Article 105 of the Insolvency Regulations, dated 14 December 2010. The Liquidators and, through them, the Bank seek substantial damages against Mr Babiker for alleged breaches of contract and of fiduciary duty, for alleged delict and breaches of applicable Qatari regulatory provisions; and they seek an account for monies allegedly misapplied by Mr Babiker. Quantified claims against Mr Babiker are set out in schedule 2 to the Amended Points of Counterclaim etc and amount to just under QR 700,000.
- 4 Mr Babiker states that he has deposited the sum of QR 300,000 with the Public Prosecutor by way of guarantee of his ability to repay this sum,

which Mr Babiker says constituted a loan made to him by the Bank, and that the guarantee is not an admission of wrongdoing.

- The Liquidators also submit that, given the conduct complained of, there is a real risk of dissipation of his assets by Mr Babiker, who may leave the jurisdiction once he is able to do so and thus avoid the need, if so ordered, to disclose his assets to the Liquidators and otherwise escape the claims made by the Liquidators and the Bank.
- In his submission (by his advocates) dated 10 January 2011 Mr Babiker argued that this Court's judgment in respect of case 04/2010 is not final, but is subject to appeal. We observe that, in any event, an appeal would not be an answer to the application for at least two reasons. First, the Liquidators are entitled to rely upon having a good arguable case in relation to the allegations made in action 05/2010 against Mr Babiker. Second, the Court's judgment would stand unless and until it is reversed on appeal.
- Next, Mr Babiker submits that this Court should take into account the fact that there are now no criminal proceedings against him, and that he has deposited with the Public Prosecutor the sum of QR 300,000 referred to above. The Court does take into account that this deposit exists. However, this Court comments that it is concerned with civil claims, and the Liquidators and the Bank have brought civil claims against Mr Babiker in the proceedings to which we have referred above. The fact that there may now be no criminal charge against Mr Babiker does not suggest that no civil claim is available to the Liquidators.
- We now turn to Mr Babiker's additional submissions dated 20 January 2011, which were made with leave of the Court.
- 9 It is, in essence, submitted, that Mr Babiker has defences to the claims brought by the Liquidators. However, the Court does not proceed on the basis that there are no defences. At this stage (namely before a trial) it

only needs to satisfy itself that the Liquidators have a good arguable case against Mr Babiker. The Court is satisfied of this on the materials before it, including its own findings in respect of case 04/2010. This is not a case where the claim by the Liquidators rests simply on untested allegations.

Mr Babiker also submits, that even assuming he committed any of the actions listed in Article 97 of the Insolvency Regulations (an allegation upon which the Liquidators rely), he did not commit such action while expecting Al Mal Bank LLC to be placed in liquidation. Article 97 provides as follows:

"When a Company is ordered to be wound up ... Article 105 [which provides for summary remedies] shall apply in respect of any person, being a past or present officer of the Company, who, within the 12 months immediately preceding the commencement of the winding up, has [committed one or more of 6 listed acts] in each case with the intention of defrauding the creditors of the Company or concealing the state of the Company from any person."

Article 97 does not require proof that the officer acted at a time when he or she expected the company to be wound up. It merely specifies a time frame by reference to which the remedies available under Article 105 may be sought. It is further submitted that there is no civil jurisdiction to make a freezing order. However, as the Court has held in respect of case 09/2010 concerning Mr Nazim Omara on 12 December 2010 (where the same point had been taken), and subject to any further submissions that may be made, we consider that there is such jurisdiction. We refer to the full text of this judgment [and attach a copy of it]. The Court said at paragraph 28:

"The Court's power, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by art 8(3)(C)(c/3) of the QFC Law to make the Freezing Order is to be found in the Insolvency Regulations. Article 105 authorises the Court, on the application of the Liquidators, 'in relation to any conduct referred to in arts 97 to 103', to make any order it sees fit in relation to a person to whom art 105 applies. The orders the Court can make include an order requiring a person 'to do, or not to do, any act or thing' (art 105(4)). This power is clearly wide enough to support an order restraining a person from dealing with his or her assets, where there is a risk of dissipation of those

assets, on the application of any party claiming to have a good cause of action against the first person."

- Mr Babiker's advocates also refer to English procedure rules for the purpose of arguing that before a freezing order can be made, a claim must already be filed with the court. This Court applies its own Rules and Procedures. In any event, in the present case a claim has been filed against Mr Babiker by the Liquidators, namely by the Amended Points of Counterclaim and the Points in support of the Application to which we have referred in paragraph 3.
- Finally, with regard to the application that a restriction be placed on Mr Babiker's ability to leave the jurisdiction, reliance is placed on national and international provisions protecting a person's freedom to travel. The Court takes these fully into account. However, as explained in paragraph 11 above, unless the Court is persuaded otherwise, it has jurisdiction to make such an order, should it see fit to do so. It is common ground between the Liquidators and Mr Babiker, that at present Mr Babiker is in any event not able to travel, lacking the necessary exit visa and other documentation he needs to secure before being able to leave Qatar. In these circumstances the Court does not see fit to make a restriction on travel order.
- The material before the court justifies the making of a freezing order on an interim basis. However, Mr Babiker should have the opportunity, if he wishes, to apply for a variation or discharge of the freezing order. As has been stated in paragraph 9, the Court has acted on the material before it. Mr Babiker, if he wishes, may file additional evidence to support any application he makes in relation to the freezing order.
- The Court is prepared to hold an oral hearing on 10 April 2011 in Doha to deal with any application that Mr Babiker or the Liquidators may wish to make.

RULING

- 16 For the reasons given above, the Court makes the following orders:
 - (1) The Freezing Order attached to this judgment and signed by a Justice of the Court, such order to operate until further order of the Court.
 - (2) An order that within 14 days of the date hereof, Mr Babiker disclose his assets, verified by affidavit, as stipulated by the attached Order.
 - (3) The matter is adjourned until 10 April 2011 in Doha to consider any further applications that may be made by the parties.
 - (4) Liberty is granted to the parties to apply on 24 hours notice.
 - (5) Costs are reserved.
- 17 The Court makes the following observations about the interim freezing order:
 - it is limited to QR 400,000, being the amount of the Liquidators' quantified claims less the QR 300,000 held by the Public Prosecutor:
 - it makes provision for Mr Babiker's legal and living expenses; and
 - it is not in the nature of an attachment of any property of chattels but is an order operating against Mr Babiker personally.
- We note that Mr Babiker's representatives have offered on his behalf to provide an affidavit relating to his assets. It is important that any such affidavit be both frank and complete.

Mr Babiker's representatives have informed the Court that he is not in any event able to travel and leave Qatar for the time being. If there should be any material change in the circumstances of Mr Babiker, these should be brought to the attention of the Court and of the Liquidators.

Representation:

For the Applicant: Ms. Muna Al-Mutawa (Law Office of Muna Yousef Al Mutawa, Doha, Qatar)

For the Respondent: Mr. Jim Delkousis (DLA Piper, Dubai, UAE) and Mr Michael Swainston QC and Mr. Edward Harrison (Brick Court Chambers, London, UK)

Signed by: Justice Dohmann, Presiding Judge, QFC Civil and Commercial Court:

B Dolman





In the name of His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar

IN THE CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL COURT OF THE QATAR FINANCIAL CENTRE

16 February 2011

CASE NO: 05/2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE							
WINDING UP OF AL MAL BANK LLC							
NAZIM OMARA	Applicant						
AND							
TAHA BABIKER	Applicant						
٧.							
AL MAL BANK LLC	Respondent						
ORDER							

Members of the Court:

Justice Dohmann

Justice Lord Cullen

Justice Sackville

PENAL NOTICE

IF YOU, THE RESPONDENT, TAHA BABIKER DISOBEY THIS ORDER YOU MAY BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND MAY BE FINED.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WITHIN QATAR WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS THE RESPONDENT TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY ALSO BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND MAY BE FINED.

UPON reading the evidence filed and the submissions of both Parties

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

This is a Freezing Order made against Taha Babiker (the "Respondent") on the application of the Joint Liquidators of Al Mal Bank LLC (the "Liquidators"). The court read the affidavit listed in Schedule 1 and accepted the undertakings set out in Schedule 2 at the end of this Freezing Order.

FREEZING ORDER

- 2 Until 10 April 2011 or further order of the Court in the meantime, the Respondent must not, except with the prior written consent of the Applicant:
 - remove from Qatar any of his assets which are in Qatar up to the value of QAR 400,000; or
 - (ii) in any way dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of any of his assets, in Qatar, up to the same value; or
 - (iii) in any way dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of any of his assets outside Qatar unless the value of his assets in Qatar exceeds QAR 400,000.
- Paragraph 2 applies to all the Respondent's assets whether or not they are in his own name, whether they are solely or jointly owned and whether the Respondent is interested in them legally, beneficially or otherwise. For the purpose of this order the Respondent's assets include any asset which he has the power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with as if it were his own. The Respondent is to be regarded as having such power if a third party holds or controls the asset in accordance with his direct or indirect instructions.
- 4 If the total value free of charges or other securities ("unencumbered value") of the Respondent's assets in Qatar exceeds QAR 400,000, the Respondent may remove

any of those assets from Qatar or may dispose of or deal with them so long as the total unencumbered value of the Respondent's assets still in Qatar remains above QAR 400,000.

If the total unencumbered value of the Respondent's assets in Qatar does not exceed QAR 400,000, the Respondent must not remove any of those assets from Qatar and must not dispose of or deal with any of them. If the Respondent has other assets outside Qatar, he may dispose of or deal with those assets outside Qatar so long as the total unencumbered value of all his assets in Qatar remains above QAR 400,000.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION

- Unless and to the extent that paragraph 7 hereof applies, the Respondent must within 14 days of being served with this order and to the best of his ability inform the Applicant in writing of all his assets worldwide in excess of US\$5000 whether in his own name or not and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and details of all such assets including, but not limited to: (a) all claims that the Respondent is pursuing in arbitration or litigation against debtors; (b) the name of the party against whom he is claiming; (c) the quantum of the claim; (d) the forum in which the claim is being made; (e) whether or not any award or judgment has been issued; (f) the date of any hearing (if fixed); and (g) the name of the solicitors acting on behalf of the opposite party in respect of each claim.
- If the provision of any of this information is likely to incriminate the Respondent, he may be entitled to refuse to provide it, but is recommended to take legal advice before refusing to provide the information. Wrongful refusal to provide the information may be a contempt of court and may render the Respondent liable to be imprisoned, fined or have his assets seized.

EXCEPTIONS TO THIS ORDER

Paragraph 2 of this order does not prohibit the Respondent from spending up to QR 25,000 (twenty five thousand riyals) a week towards his ordinary living expenses and nor does it prohibit the Respondent from spending a reasonable amount on legal advice and representation. But before spending any money the Respondent must tell the Applicant in writing (including by email) where the money to be spent is to be taken from.

- 9 This order does not prohibit the Respondent from dealing with or disposing of any of his assets in the ordinary and proper course of business.
- The Respondent may agree with the Applicant that the above spending limits should be increased or that this order should be varied in any other respect, but any agreement must be in writing.
- 11 The order will cease to have effect if the Respondent-
 - (a) provides security by paying the sum of QAR 400,000 into court, to be held to the order of the court; or
 - (b) makes provision for security in that sum by another method agreed with the Applicant.

COSTS

12 The costs of this application are reserved to 10 April 2011 or further order.

VARIATION OR DISCHARGE OF THIS ORDER

There shall be liberty to apply for anyone served with or notified of this order at any time to vary or discharge this order (or so much of it as affects that person), but they must first provide two days prior written notice to the Applicant and other interested parties. If any evidence is to be relied upon in support of the application, the substance of it must be communicated in writing to the Applicant two days in advance.

PARTIES OTHER THAN THE APPLICANT AND RESPONDENT

14.1 Effect of this order

14.1.1 It may be a contempt of court for any person notified of this order knowingly to assist in or permit a breach of this order. Any person doing so may be fined.

14.2 Set off by banks

14.2.1 This order does not prevent any bank from exercising any right of set off it may have in respect of any facility which it gave to the Respondent before it was notified of this order.

14.3 Withdrawals by the Respondent

14.3.1 No bank need enquire as to the application or proposed application of any money withdrawn by the Respondent if the withdrawal appears to be permitted by this order.

14.4 Persons outside Qatar

- 14.4.1 Except as provided in paragraph 14.4.2 below, the terms of this order do not affect or concern anyone outside the jurisdiction of this court.
- 14.4.2 The terms of this order will affect the following persons in a country or state outside the jurisdiction of this court:
 - (a) the Respondent or his agent appointed by power of attorney;
 - (b) any person who-
 - (i) is subject to the jurisdiction of this court;
 - (ii) has been given written notice of this order at his residence or place of business within the jurisdiction of this court; and
 - (iii) is able to prevent acts or omissions outside the jurisdiction of this court which constitute or assist in a breach of the terms of this order; and
 - (c) any other person, only to the extent that this order is declared enforceable by or is enforced by a court in that country or state.

14.5 Assets located outside Qatar

- 14.5.1 Nothing in this order shall, in respect of assets located outside Qatar, prevent any third party from complying with:
 - (a) what it reasonably believes to be its obligations, contractual or otherwise, under the laws and obligations of the country or state in which those assets are situated or under the proper law of any contract between itself and the Respondent; and
 - (b) any orders of the courts of that country or state, provided that reasonable notice of any application for such an order is given to the Applicant.

COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE COURT

All communications to the court about this order should be sent to QFC Civil and Commercial Court, QFC Tower 2, Al Wahda Street, West Bay, PO Box 13667, Doha, Qatar. The telephone number is +974 4496 8220. The email address for the Assistant Registrar is c.campbellholt@qfcj.org.qa.

The offices are open between 9 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. Sunday to Thursday.

Signed by: Justice Dohmann, Presiding Judge, QFC Civil and Commercial Court,

B Dolman



Schedule 1 - Affidavits

- 1 The Applicant relied on the following affidavits:
 - (a) The affidavit of Joanne Kim Rolls dated 17 December 2010.

Schedule 2 - Undertakings Given To The Court By The Applicant

The Applicant will pay the reasonable costs of anyone other than the Respondent which have been incurred as a result of this order including the costs of finding out whether that person holds any of the Respondent's assets and if the court later finds that this order has caused such person loss, and decides that such person should be compensated for that loss, the Applicant will comply with any order the court may make.

If this order ceases to have effect (for example, if the Respondent provides security) the Applicant will immediately take all reasonable steps to inform in writing anyone to whom he has given notice of this order, or who he has reasonable grounds for supposing may act upon this order, that it has ceased to have effect.

The Applicant will not without the permission of the court use any information obtained as a result of this order ("the Information") for the purpose of any civil or criminal proceedings, either in Qatar or in any other jurisdiction, other than in relation to this order and for the purpose of locating and/or preserving assets. The Applicant shall not permit anyone else to have any access to the Information (or any of it), save that the information provided by the Respondent may be provided to the Applicant's representatives and counsel on terms that it shall not be disclosed or otherwise communicated in any way to any other person, that they shall keep such Information confidential and that they shall keep all copies of such Information securely safe as required by law and/or in support of a freezing of assets application. The Applicant shall keep the information confidential and shall keep all copies of the Information securely.

If the court later finds that this order has caused loss to the Respondent, and decides that the Respondent should be compensated for that loss, the Applicant will comply with any order the court may make.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF RESPONDENT:

Al Mal Bank LLC

(acting by its duly appointed Liquidators)

DETAILS OF THE RESPONDENT'S SOLICITORS:

Jim Delkousis
DLA Piper Middle East LLP

Level 11 Alfardan Office Tower PO Box 25800 Doha West Bay Qatar



In the name of His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar

IN THE CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL COURT OF THE QATAR FINANCIAL CENTRE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CASE NO: 05/2010 14 October 2010

IN THE MATTER OF AL MAL BANK LLC (IN LIQUIDATION)

NAZIM OMARA Applicant

- and -

AL MAL BANK LLC Respondent

Members of the Court:

JUSTICE DOHMANN
JUSTICE LORD CULLEN
JUSTICE SACKVILLE

ORDER OF THE COURT

UPON the Court having made an Order in Case No. 01/2010 for the compulsory winding up of Al Mal Bank LLC on the 6th June 2010.

AND UPON THE Liquidators of the Al Mal Bank LLC having applied to the Court under Article 95(1) of the QFC Insolvency Regulations to determine certain questions.

AND HAVING HEARD oral evidence and considered written evidence to determine what was the Applicant's applicable contract and whether the termination of his employment was lawful.

AT THE CONCLUSION of the evidence in the case, and Counsel for the Applicant having sought leave of the Court to withdraw his claims made against the Al Mal Bank LLC on the basis that the Applicant no longer pursued any claims in these proceedings arising out of his employment with the Al Mal Bank LLC.

THE COURT ORDERED THAT:

- The Applicant's Particulars of Claim and the action dated 17th May 2010 be DISMISSED without prejudice to any counterclaim by the Liquidators against the Applicant, in the same proceedings;
- In any such counterclaim proceedings, the evidence adduced on the application, before this Court, of the Liquidators under Article 95 of the QFC Insolvency Regulations, should stand as evidence in those proceedings and in any related application by the Liquidators in the insolvency counterclaim.
- In any such counterclaim proceedings, the proceedings will be conducted on the basis that the only contract in force between the Applicant and the Bank was the

"Short Form" Contract dated 25th May 2008, with a commencement date of 1st June 2008.

- 4. In the liquidation and any counterclaim proceedings, those proceedings should proceed on the basis that:
 - a) The only contract in force as between the Applicant and the Bank was the Short Form Contract;
 - b) The Applicant had no claim on the basis of such Short Form Contract, or the Long Form Contract dated 1st June 2008, or under the Employment Regulations 2006, or otherwise.
- 5. Any application for costs by the Liquidators of Al Mal Bank LLC should be submitted to the Court to be considered in writing. Counsel for the Applicant indicated to the Court that the Applicant did not oppose an application for costs in favour of the Liquidators, nor on an indemnity basis.

By the Court,

Michael McKenzie CB QC Registrar of the Court

Signed by: Justice Dohmann, Presiding Judge, QFC Civil and Commercial Court:

B Dolman



In the name of His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar

IN THE CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL COURT OF THE QATAR FINANCIAL CENTRE

12 December 2010

CASE NO: 09/2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE
WINDING UP OF AL MAL BANK LLC

NAZIM OMARA

V

AL MAL BANK LLC (IN LIQUIDATION)

JUDGMENT ON APPLICATION
TO DISCHARGE FREEZING ORDER

Members of the Court:

Justice Dohmann

Justice Lord Cullen

Justice Sackville

ORDERS

- The application to discharge the order made on 14 October 2010 ("Freezing Order") is dismissed.
- Mr Omara is to comply with paras 8-12 of the Freezing Order within 14 days of this Judgment.
- Mr Omara is to pay the Liquidators' costs of opposing the application to discharge the Freezing Order.

JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

THE APPLICATION

- On 14 October 2010, on the application of the Liquidators of the Al Mal Bank LLC ("Bank"), this Court made what is described as a "Precautionary Attachment Order" in relation to the assets of Mr Nazim Omara ("Mr Omara"), the former Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of the Bank. The order was made at the close of a hearing which was held to determine, among other matters, a claim by Mr Omara for wrongful dismissal by the Bank. Mr Omara withdrew his claim on the same day as the order was made, although the Court had foreshadowed on 10 October 2010 that it was prepared to make an order preventing Mr Omara disposing of his assets.
- The order of 14 October 2010 (which we refer to as the "Freezing Order"), was made by the Court in anticipation of the Liquidators instituting proceedings against Mr Omara claiming compensation for losses said to be caused to the Bank by Mr Omara's alleged misconduct. The Liquidators instituted proceedings on 22 October 2010 against Mr Omara by way of a counter-claim in Proceedings 05/2010 and a parallel application under art 105 of the QFC Insolvency Regulations (No 5 of 2005) ("Insolvency Regulations"). (The terms of art 105 are referred to at [11] below).
- By an application dated 27 October 2010, signed by Mr Omara personally, he applied to discharge or revoke the Freezing Order. He also sought orders dismissing or staying the proceedings against him instituted by the Bank. Mr Omara subsequently filed an unsigned witness statement, dated 3 November 2010, in support of the discharge application.

- The Liquidators filed written submissions in response to Mr Omara's application on 4 November 2010. Mr Omara responded to the Liquidators' submissions on 13 November 2010. Mr Omara's response, like the discharge application, was signed by him personally but his contentions raise legal arguments.
- In essence Mr Omara contends that the Court lacked jurisdiction to make the Freezing Order and that the Order amounts to an invalid attachment of his property. The terms of the Freezing Order are set out in an Appendix to this judgment.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The QFC Law

- Since Mr Omara challenges the Freezing Order on jurisdictional grounds, it is convenient at the outset to explain the scope of the Court's jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is defined in *The Qatar Financial Centre Law* (Law No 7 of 2005), as amended by *Law No 2 of 2009* ("*QFC Law*").
- Article 8(3) of the QFC Law establishes a Court called the Civil and Commercial Court of the Qatar Financial Centre ("Court"). The "First Instance Circuit" of the Court has jurisdiction under art 8(3)(c) of the QFC Law to hear the following disputes:
 - "c/1- Civil and commercial disputes arising from transactions, contracts, arrangements or incidences taking place in or from the QFC between the entities established therein.
 - c/2- Civil and commercial disputes arising between The QFC authorities or institutions and the entities established therein.
 - c/3- Civil and commercial disputes arising between entities established in The QFC and contractors therewith and employees thereof, unless the parties agree otherwise.

- c/4- Civil and commercial disputes arising from transactions, contracts or arrangements taking place between entities established within The QFC and residents of The State, or entities established in the State but outside The QFC, unless the parties agree otherwise."
- The Bank is an entity established in the Qatar Financial Centre ("QFC") (The QFC itself is set up by art 2 of the QFC Law.) It follows that the jurisdiction of the Court includes hearing civil and commercial disputes:
 - arising from transactions, contracts or arrangements taking place in or from the QFC between the Bank and other entities established in the QFC; and
 - arising between the Bank and contractors with or employees of the Bank (unless the parties agree otherwise).
- 9 Mr Omara relies on cll 15 and 16 of Sched 6 to the QFC Law. These provide as follows:
 - Once the chairman and the members are appointed, The Civil and Commercial Court shall lay down its operational rulebook and proceedings in accordance with the provisions of this Law, the fundamental litigation principles and international best practices. Such rulebook and proceedings shall not be in effect until approved by The Council of Ministers.
 - 16. The provisions of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Law as issued by law no (13) of the year 1990 and amendments thereof, shall apply to the claims submitted before The Civil and Commercial Court, where The QFC Law and the rulebook and proceedings put in force by the Court by virtue of the previous clause, are silent on the concerned matter."

Insolvency Regulations

10 In determining the source of the Court's power to make freezing orders of the kind made against Mr Omara, the *Insolvency Regulations* are relevant.

- Article 105 of the *Insolvency Regulations* provides that the Court may, on application by a liquidator, in relation to any conduct referred to in arts 97 to 103, make any order the Court sees fit in relation to a person to whom art 105 applies. The orders which the Court may make include the following:
 - "(1) an order to return or pay to the Company any money or other property of the Company which he has misapplied or retained, or become accountable for;
 - an order to compensate the Company in respect of any misfeasance or breach of any fiduciary or other duty in relation to the Company;
 - (3) an order to make such contributions (if any) to the Company's assets as the [Court] thinks proper; or
 - (4) an order requiring the person to do, or not to do, any act or thing."
- 12 Articles 97, 99 and 102 of the *Insolvency Regulations* provide as follows:

"Article 97 - Fraud in anticipation of winding up

When a Company is ordered to be wound up ... Article 105 shall apply in respect of any person, being a past or present officer of the Company, who, within the 12 months immediately preceding the commencement of the winding up, has:

- concealed any part of the Company's property to the value of US\$200.00 or more; or concealed any debt due to or from the Company;
- (2) fraudulently removed any part of the Company's property to the value of US\$200.00 or more;
- concealed, destroyed, mutilated or falsified any book or paper affecting or relating to the Company's property or affairs;
- (4) made any false entry in any book or paper affecting or relating to the Company's property or affairs;

- (5) fraudulently parted with, altered or made any omission in any document affecting or relating to the Company's property or affairs; or
- (6) ...

In each case with the intention of defrauding the creditors of the Company or concealing the state of the Company from any person.

...

Article 99 - Falsification of Company's books

When a company is being wound up, Article 105 shall apply to an officer or shareholder or other person liable to contribute to the assets of the Company if he destroys, mutilates, alters or falsifies any books, papers or securities, or makes or is privy to the making of any false or fraudulent entry in any register, book of account or document belonging to the Company with intent to defraud or deceive any person.

. . .

Article 102 - Fraudulent trading

If in the course of the winding up of a Company, it appears that any business of the Company has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the Company or creditors of any other person, or for any fraudulent purpose, Article 105 shall apply to any persons who were knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business in the manner mentioned above."

Civil and Commercial Procedure Law

13 Clause 16 of Sched 6 to the QFC Law (reproduced at [9] above) refers to the provision of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Law (No 13 of 1990) ("CCP Law"). Mr Omara's submissions rely particularly on arts 398 to 404 of the CCP Law, which deal with the circumstances in which a creditor may execute a "precautionary attachment" on the movable property of a debtor.

14 It is not necessary to set out arts 398 to 404 in full. We need refer only to the relevant portions of arts 398, 401 and 402:

"Article 398

Subject to the provisions of article (401), the creditor may execute a precautionary attachment on the movables of his debtor in the following circumstances:

- If he is the holder of a bill of exchange or promissory note, and the debtor is a merchant who has endorsed the bill of exchange or promissory note that obliges him to fulfilment, according to the Commercial law.
- If the debtor has no regular residence in Qatar, or if the creditor, for serious reasons, has fears that the debtor would escape, or smuggle or hide his money.
- In every other case in which the creditor fears to lose the guarantee for his right.

Article 401

The precautionary attachment shall not be executed in the aforementioned circumstances unless in implementation for an incontestable right and which is due.

If the creditor has no executive deed or enforceable ruling, or if his debt is of no definite amount, no precautionary attachment shall be executed except by an order from the enforcement judge, authorizing the attachment and temporarily assessing the applicant's of the attachment order right.

This matter requires a reasoned petition that, in the case mentioned in the previous article, must include a thorough statement on the movables to be attached.

The judge, before giving his order, may make a brief investigation if he is not satisfied with the documents supporting the request.

If the claim is properly brought up before the competent court, attachment permission may be requested from its chairman.

Article 402

In precautionary attachment on the movables, the rules and procedures set forth in part IV, chapter I, of this book, except those relating to the identification of the sale day, shall be followed.

...

In cases where the attachment is executed by an order from the enforcement judge in accordance with the second paragraph of the preceding article, the applicant of the attachment order, during the two weeks referred to in the preceding paragraph, must bring before the qualitatively competent court a claim proving his right and the validity of the attachment order, otherwise the attachment shall be considered as non-existing."

REASONING: APPLICATION TO DISCHARGE FREEZING ORDER

15 We shall deal first with Mr Omara's application to discharge the Freezing Order. We do so by reference to the headings adopted by Mr Omara, which were also adopted by the Liquidators in their written submissions. However, we follow a different order.

Jurisdiction

- The word "jurisdiction" is capable of many meanings. In the present context it means the authority of a court to hear and determine a claim or dispute.
- Mr Omara submits that the Court lacks jurisdiction to make orders of the kind made against him. He contends that, as the Liquidators are named as the claimants in the proceedings against him and as they themselves are not QFC entities, art 8(3)(c)(c/3) of the QFC Law does not confer jurisdiction on the Court to make the Freezing Order.
- Article 8(3)(c)(c/3) of the QFC Law confers jurisdiction on the Court to hear, among other matters, civil and commercial disputes arising between entities established in the QFC and employees of such entities. As we

have noted, the Bank is an entity established in the QFC. It is not in dispute that Mr Omara was an employee of the Bank until 17 November 2009.

- Although the Bank is in liquidation, it continues to exist as a legal entity. A winding up order has never been thought to end the corporate status of the company concerned, until it is finally dissolved: Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) Ltd [1918] 1 KB 592. The claims against Mr Omara are not brought by the Liquidators for their personal benefit. They are brought on behalf of the Bank. It follows that the claims made by the Liquidators, including the claim for the Freezing Order, have arisen between the Bank and Mr Omara as an employee of the Bank.
- It is of course true that Mr Omara is no longer an employee of the Bank. However, art 8(3)(c)(c/3) of the QFC Law is plainly concerned with disputes that have arisen out of or in consequence of the relationship between a corporation, such as the Bank, and its employees. Of necessity, many of these disputes will be formalised in litigation after the employer-employee relationship has terminated. That does not take them outside the scope of art 8(3)(c)(c/3) of the QFC Law. Were this so, the Court would not have had jurisdiction to hear and determine Mr Omara's own claim against the Bank for wrongful dismissal.
- There are other bases on which the court may well have jurisdiction to hear and determine the Liquidators' claim for the Freezing Order against Mr Omara. For example, once a party properly invokes the jurisdiction of the Court to pursue a claim against a corporation, a counter-claim filed by the respondent (or a liquidator acting on its behalf) against the claimant is very likely to be within the jurisdiction of the Court. Article 8(3)(c)(c/1) of the QFC Law, the terms of which are not entirely clear, may be another source of jurisdiction.
- 22 It is not, however, necessary to pursue these questions further. The Court had jurisdiction under art 8(3)(c)(c/3) of the QFC Law to deal with the

dispute between the Liquidators and Mr Omara, including the Liquidator's claim for the Freezing Order.

Applicable Laws and Procedures

- 23 That a court has jurisdiction to hear a dispute between parties does not necessarily mean that it has the power to make a particular order in those proceedings. The concepts of jurisdiction and power are not co-extensive.
- Mr Omara contends that the Court lacked power to make the freezing order. He submits that until the Court's operational rules are approved, it is obliged by cl 16 of Sched 6 to the QFC Law to apply the CCP Law. Mr Omara argues that the Court is limited to the power of ordering a "precautionary attachment" conferred by the CCP Law (set out at [14] above). He further says that it is not open to the Court to rely on international best practice (as is contemplated in the Court's Practice Guide (No 1 of 2009), when the relevant principles are contained in the CCP Law.
- Mr Omara submits that the Freezing Order was not made and could not have been made in compliance with the CCP Law. In particular, he agues that neither the Liquidators nor the Bank had an "incontestable right", for the purposes of art 401 of the CCP Law, at the date the Freezing Order was made. He also submits that the Freezing Order was not made by an enforcement judge in conformity with the requirements of art 401.
- Mr Omara's submissions are based on a misconception, although to be fair to him (or his advisers) the misconception may have been induced by the somewhat misleading heading to the Freezing Order. The Freezing Order is not and (despite the heading) does not purport to be a "precautionary attachment order" of the kind contemplated by the CCP Law. The Freezing Order does not attach to Mr Omara's movables or indeed to any of his property. The Freezing Order operates on Mr Omara

personally by restraining him from removing from Qatar or otherwise disposing of or dealing with his assets, except as permitted by the terms of the Order itself. The Freezing Order is, in the language used by lawyers familiar with equitable principles, an order *in personam*, binding on the person subject to the order. It is not an order *in rem*, binding by its own force on particular property or assets of the person subject to the order.

- 27 The Court's power to make the Freezing Order does not derive from the CCP Law, which is concerned with quite different processes available to creditors in Qatar. Nor does the Court's power to make the Freezing Order derive from the Practice Guide's incorporation of international best practice, in default of approved operational rules.
- The Court's power, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by art 8(3)(c)(c/3) of the *QFC Law*, to make the Freezing Order is to be found in the *Insolvency Regulations*. Article 105 authorises the Court, on the application of the Liquidators, "in relation to any conduct referred to in arts 97 to 103", to make any order it sees fit in relation to a person to whom art 105 applies. The orders the Court can make include an order requiring a person "to do, or not to do, any act or thing" (art 105(4)). This power is clearly wide enough to support an order restraining a person from dealing with his or her assets, where there is a risk of dissipation of those assets, on the application of a party claiming to have a good cause of action against the first person.
- The claims made against Mr Omara by the Liquidators, on behalf of the Bank, are in relation to conduct referred to in arts 97 to 103. Among other things, it is alleged that Mr Omara maintained and operated undisclosed accounts in the name of the Bank, improperly withdrew and paid out funds from those accounts and falsified records of the Bank (see arts 97(1), (2), (4), 99, 100).
- 30 Mr Omara himself is a person to whom art 105 applies. Article 97, for example, states that art 105 shall apply to a person, being a past officer of

the company in liquidation, who has, within the 12 months immediately preceding the commencement of the winding up, who has committed any of the acts identified in art 97. Mr Omara was the CEO of the Bank and it is alleged that he committed a number of improper acts referred to in art 97 within the relevant period.

- It is clearly not necessary, in order for the power in art 105 of the *Insolvency Regulations* to apply, that the Court has previously authoritatively determined that the allegations against the relevant person are true. If that were the case, the Court would be rendered powerless to preserve assets of an alleged wrongdoer or, for that matter of the company itself, pending the final determination of a claim made by the Liquidators. It cannot have been intended that art 105 should be given such a narrow construction. The effect of such a narrow construction would often be to prevent the Court, on the application of a liquidator, from taking effective measures against wrongdoers whose actions have detrimentally affected the creditors of the company in liquidation.
- In any event, in the present case, the Court made the Freezing Order after it had heard a great deal of evidence in the wrongful dismissal proceedings brought by Mr Omara against the Bank. To put the matter at its lowest, the evidence, including Mr Omara's own admissions, established a very strong prima facie case of wrongdoing against him, as can be seen from the findings recorded in the Court's judgment in Taha Babiker v Al Mal Bank [Case 04/2010, QFC Civil and Commercial Court of First Instance, 1 December 2010]. This is not a case where the claim by the Liquidators rests on untested allegations.
- For these reasons, the challenge to the Court's power to make the Freezing Order fails.

THE APPLICATION TO STAY OR DISMISS

Indemnity

- In support of his application to dismiss the proceedings against him, Mr Omara asserts that any such proceedings are futile, because he was an officer of the Bank and is therefore entitled to an indemnity in respect of claims against him in that capacity. He relies on:
 - art 61(1) of the QFC Companies Regulations (No 2 of 2005)
 ("Companies Regulations"), which provides that a company may in
 its articles grant an indemnity in respect of "any negligence, default,
 breach of duty or breach of trust of which the Officer may be guilty
 in relation to the LLC or any Subsidiary thereof"; and
 - the Bank's Articles of Association, which, in art 28, contain an indemnity "to the extent allowed by the Regulations", that is, by Companies Regulations.
- We note that art 61(1) of the Companies Regulations does not cover alleged fraud.
- In response to Mr Omara's submissions, the Liquidators cite art 61(2) of the *Companies Regulations*, which provides as follows:

"Any provision whether contained in the articles of association of the LLC or in any contract or arrangement between the LLC and any Officer ... exempting such Officer or person from, or indemnifying him against any liability which by virtue of the rule of law would otherwise attach to him in respect of any fraud or dishonesty of which he may be guilty in relation to the LLC shall be void provided that, notwithstanding anything in this Article 61 an LLC may, in pursuance of any such provision as aforesaid, indemnify any such Officer or auditor against any liability incurred by him in defending any proceedings, whether civil or criminal in which judgment is given in his favour or in which he is acquitted".

We accept the Liquidators' submission that, against the background of the trial of Mr Omara's own claim and the defence to it, the allegations now levelled against him are serious allegations of fraudulent misconduct and dishonesty which fall squarely within art 61(2). As the Liquidators correctly submit, the exclusion of an indemnity for fraud or dishonesty by art 61(2) is entirely conventional and is incorporated in the corporate codes of most countries with developed regulatory regimes.

Mr Omara's contention that the indemnity provided by the Bank's Articles of Association justifies a stay of the Liquidators' proceedings is without foundation. We reject it.

Stay

Mr Omara applies, in the alternative, for a stay of the proceedings against him. He relies on art 322 of the *Criminal Procedures Law* (No 23 of 2004), which provides as follows:

"If the civil action is filed prior to the criminal action or during its procedures, the decision thereof stays pending until a final judgment is rendered on the criminal action. The stay of the action shall not prohibit undertaking precautionary and urgent procedures".

- The Liquidators correctly point out that by the terms of art 322 of the Criminal Procedure Law, any stay does not preclude precautionary or urgent procedures such as the Freezing Order.
- The Liquidators submit that art 322 of the *Criminal Procedure Law* has no application in the present case, for the following reasons:
 - Not every "civil action" should be stayed because of criminal proceedings; it should be shown that pursuit of the relevant civil action will prejudice the criminal proceedings in some way and Mr Omara has made no attempt to do that.
 - On the contrary, Mr Omara chose not to seek a stay of his own claim, which raised substantially the same factual issues as the present proceedings initiated by the Liquidators. They submit that

having made that election in relation to his own action, it would be unjust if Mr Omara were permitted to resile from it in related proceedings in which he happens to be the party sued.

- While an action by the Bank under the direction of the Liquidators might be a "civil action" for the purposes of art 322 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the Liquidators' application under art 105 of the Insolvency Regulations is less easily described as such. Rather, it is a procedure designed to permit the Liquidators to gain control of or recover assets in the interests of creditors. It would be very odd if the conduct of a liquidation had to be deferred until criminal proceedings against an officer or former officer of the company concerned were completed.
- It is not necessary for the Court to address the arguments advanced by the Liquidators. We should not be taken, however, as accepting that an application under art 105 of the *Insolvency Regulations* is not a "civil action", nor that Mr Omara's so-called "election" is necessarily relevant to the question of a stay.
- The difficulty confronting Mr Omara is that he has adduced no evidence to show that a prosecution has in fact been instituted against him (as distinct from a criminal investigation). If a prosecution has been instituted, there is no evidence as to the charges levelled against him and whether there is any overlap between any such charges and the issues arising in the proceedings instituted by the Liquidators. We have no basis for concluding that the conduct of the Liquidators' proceedings against Mr Omara will prejudice him in his defence to any prosecution that may be on foot.
- 44 At this stage, it is not appropriate to make any order staying the Liquidators' counter-claims or their applications under art 105 of the *Insolvency Regulations*. If Mr Omara renews his application and supports

it by appropriate evidence, the Court will be prepared to give consideration

to it.

FURTHER RELIEF

45 An important part of the Freezing Order was the requirement that Mr

Omara provide disclosure of his assets worldwide (see paras 8-12 of the

Freezing Orders, reproduced in the Appendix). It is not in dispute that Mr

Omara has not complied with this part of the Freezing Order. Accordingly,

the Court orders that Mr Omara complies with paras 8-12 of the Freezing

Order within 14 days from the date of this Judgment.

COSTS

46 Mr Omara's application to discharge the Freezing Order has not

succeeded. No issue therefore arises as to whether the Liquidators

should be personally liable for any costs incurred by Mr Omara in making

the application.

47 Since Mr Omara has failed in his application, the appropriate order is that

he pay the Liquidators' costs of opposing the application to discharge the

Freezing Order.

Representation:

The Court dealt with the application on written submissions. The last written

submission was from Mr. Nazim Omara dated 13 November 2010.

For the Applicant: Mr. Nazim Omara (in person)

For the Liquidator: Ms. Joanna Rolls and Ms. Jacquie de Bidaph (RMS Tenon,

London, UK)

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Signed by: Justice Dohmann, Presiding Judge, QFC Civil and Commercial Court:

B Dolman

