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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons >> Anwar, Re Possible Contempt Of Court [2008] ScotHC HCJAC_36 (01 July 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2008/HCJAC_36.html Cite as: [2008] ScotHC HCJAC_36 |
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HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
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Lord OsborneLord Kingarth Lord Wheatley |
[2008] HCJAC 36IN932/06 OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD OSBORNE in REMIT BY A TRIAL JUDGE OF
AN ISSUE OF POSSIBLE CONTEMPT OF COURT on the part of AAMER ANWAR - the respondent _______ |
Respondent: McBride, Q.C. ; J.P. Mowberry,
Solicitors,
Crown: Ogg, Q.C, A.D.; Crown Agent
The background circumstances
[1] On 17 September 2007, at the High
Court in Glasgow, Mohammed Atif Siddique was found guilty after trial on
charges which libelled that:
(1) between 1March
2003 and 13 April 2006, both dates inclusive, at 4 Myretoungate, Alva,
Clackmannanshire; Ibrox Public Library
and Glasgow Metropolitan College, both Glasgow, at Glasgow Airport,
Renfrewshire and elsewhere to the Prosecutor unknown, you did possess articles
in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that your possession
was for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of
an act of terrorism namely computers, computer files, video files, pictures and
sound files and other files; a memory
card containing computer files; mobile phones containing files and photographic
images; a number of CDs and floppy discs
containing computer files and audio files, video files and word documents
depicting amongst other things terrorist propaganda, instructions and
information on making bombs, the use of various weapon systems, terrorist and
guerilla tactics, surveillance techniques, suicide and sacrificial operations
and terrorist training camps: CONTRARY
to the Terrorism Act 2000, Section 57(1) as amended;
...
(3) on
various occasions between 1 September 2003 and 30 September 2005 at Glasgow
Metropolitan College, Glasgow you did conduct yourself in a disorderly manner
and did show to various students there images of suicide bombers and images of
the murder and beheading of persons by terrorists, threaten to become a suicide
bomber and carry out acts of terrorism in Glasgow or elsewhere, ...place said
students ...there in a state of fear and alarm and
commit a breach of the peace;
(4) between 1 September 2003 and 13 April
2006, both dates inclusive, at 4 Myretoungate, Alva, Clackmannanshire, Ibrox Public Library and Glasgow
Metropolitan College, Glasgow and elsewhere to
the Prosecutor unknown you did provide instruction or training in the making or
use of firearms and explosives by means of the Internet in that you did set up,
manage and control web sites namely www.freewebs.com/al-battar,
www.freewebs.com/sout-al-jihad
and www.freewebs.com/muaskar-al-battar
containing links to documents providing instructions on how to operate various
weaponry and to make explosives and further, containing links to other web
sites containing similar documents: CONTRARY
to the Terrorism Act 2000, Section 54(1) as amended; and
(5) on 13 April 2006, at 4 Myretoungate, Alva,
Clackmannanshire, and elsewhere to the
Prosecutor unknown you did distribute or circulate terrorist publications by
means of web sites previously set up by you namely www.freewebs.com/al-battar, www.freewebs.com/sout-al-jihad
and www.freewebs.com/muaskar-al-battar
containing links to terrorist publications with the intention that the effect
of said distribution and circulation be a direct or indirect encouragement or
other inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of
terrorism or the provision of assistance in the commission or preparation of
such acts or you were reckless as to whether your conduct had an effect
abovementioned: CONTRARY to the
Terrorism Act 2006, Section 2(1)."
The verdicts on charges (1) and (3) were by a
majority. The verdicts on charges (4)
and (5) were unanimous. Following
conviction, the case was adjourned for sentence to a sitting of the court on
[2] Soon after
the conviction of the panel on
"There is a statement that I wish to
read. Atif Siddique was today
found guilty of doing what millions of
young people do every day, looking for answers on the internet. This verdict is a tragedy for justice and for
freedom of speech and undermines the values that separate us from the
terrorist, the very values we should be fighting to protect. This prosecution was driven by the State with
no limit to the resources used to secure a conviction and it was carried out in
an atmosphere of hostility after the
"PRESS RELEASE -
HMA -v- MOHAMMED ATIF SIDDIQUE - GUILTY VERDICT
Statement read on the steps of the High Court by Mr
Siddique's Solicitor - Aamer Anwar
Today Mohammed Atif Siddique was
found guilty of doing what millions of young people do every day, looking for
answers on the internet.
This verdict is a tragedy for justice
and for freedom of speech and undermines the values that separate us from the
terrorist, the very values we should be fighting to protect.
It is farcical that part of the
evidence against Atif was that he grew a beard, had documents in Arabic which
he could not even read and downloaded material from a legitimate Israeli
website run by Dr Reuven Paz, ex Mossad. (www.e-prism.org)
When detained at
Young Muslims today live in a climate
of fear no different to that experienced by the Irish community in the last
century. There are two questions that
remain unanswered: Why websites based in
the
Since the Prevention of Terrorism
Acts of the 1970s terror laws have done little to ensure that we are safe from
terrorist attack, but much to infringe the human rights and civil liberties of
those living in the
Repression and injustice, and the
criminalisation of communities make us less safe, not more. They act as a recruiting sergeant to
extremism and marginalise those whose engagement is vital to the effective
fight against terrorism. The sensational
and biased reporting of this case breached the most important principle of
justice - that people are innocent until proven guilty. This is not a way to
isolate extremism but only encourage it.
Atif Siddique states that 'he is not
a terrorist and is innocent of the charges, that it is not a crime to be a
young Muslim angry at global injustice.'
The prosecution was driven by the
State, with no limit to the money & resources used to secure a conviction
in this case, carried out in an atmosphere of hostility after the
[4] During the
evening of
"I suspect that a deterrent sentence,
eh, will be set, but I do not think that we've asked the right question. What we should be asking is 'Why is it that
young Muslims are interested in looking for answers on radical Islamic
websites?' 'Why are they going on the
internet to look for this?' and the answers we'll keep coming back with whether the
Government likes it or not - the invasion of
[6] Following
upon the events of
"Dear Sir,
HMA v M. ATIF
SIDDIQUE
As you will be aware, the above case
is due to come before Lord Carloway on
For example: (1) it seems that in your view, as expressed
to the public, the panel 'was found guilty of doing what millions of young
people do every day, looking for answers on the internet'. This is patently not what the panel was found
guilty of. He was found guilty of,
amongst other things, possessing articles for, putting matters shortly, the
purpose of terrorism in contravention of statutory provisions; (2) it appears that in your view, as expressed
to the public, the prosecution was carried out in an atmosphere of hostility
after the Glasgow airport attack, yet no plea in bar or motion to adjourn the
case to a later date or to elsewhere was made to Lord Carloway; (3) it is your publicly expressed view that
the verdict of the jury amounted to 'a tragedy for justice'; and (4) it also
seems that in your view, as expressed to the public, the panel did not receive
a fair trial, yet, apart from the application at the commencement of the case concerning
the composition of the list of assize, no complaint of unfairness was made to
Lord Carloway during the case.
A number of points arise. The first is whether the remarks made to the
public by a solicitor instructed in the case, prior even to the sentencing of
the panel, constitute a contempt of court. Secondly, if that issue is
to be considered, whether that should be done by Lord Carloway or by a
differently constituted High Court.
Thirdly, whether the answer to the above matters
should be addressed at the same time as or after sentence. Although you have also made public remarks
about the likely sentence, Lord Carloway is anxious that no material, other
than that which is aired in court relative to the panel, should influence his
consideration of the appropriate sentence. However, it may be that Lord Carloway will
wish to correct any errors of fact which have put into the public domain.
Lord Carloway may also seek the views
of the crown on this matter and this letter will be copied to the Crown Agent
accordingly. ..."
[7] In his report
to this court, the trial judge explained that the purpose of the foregoing
letter was to afford the respondent an opportunity to make such submissions as
he wished before he, the trial judge, considered taking
any further action. By the time of the
hearing on
[9] Following that
hearing, the trial judge decided that, since the statements made by the respondent
might appear to be a criticism, not only of the jury, the prosecutor and a
witness, but also of his own conduct of the trial, he would remit the matter
for the determination of the High Court in Edinburgh; any procedure or hearings to be
presided over by a judge other than himself.
He expressed the opinion that, in the light of the issues of principle
which seemed to be involved, it might be appropriate for three judges to deal
with the matter. Thus the remit has come
before this court. Following the making
of that remit, a procedural hearing was held before us on
[10] Prior to that
hearing, the court received an application from solicitors acting for
Submissions of the respondent
[13] Senior counsel for the respondent outlined
for us the nature of the trial of the panel.
That trial had started quite soon after the recent terrorist incident at
[18] Senior counsel
indicated that the prosecution of the panel in this case was the first such
prosecution in
[19] It was
recognised that, in
[20] In response to
questions by the court, senior counsel said that what was set out in the press
release had been authorised by the panel.
In support of that position, there was produced to us a document, signed
by the panel, dated 13 September 2007, which bore to be a press release
relating to a guilty verdict in the trial, although of course the verdict had
not been returned until 17 September 2007.
Senior counsel pointed out that the terms of the statement signed by the
panel were slightly different from the terms of the statement which had
actually been released on
[21] Senior counsel
then proceeded to deal with the law of contempt of court in general. He drew our attention to Arlidge, Eady and Smith on Contempt, 3rd ed., 2005,
Chapter 16, which dealt with the law of contempt in
[23] Senior counsel
went on next to consider in detail the terms of the trial judge's report to
this court, in which his concerns as to the possibility of contempt of court
were expressed. Although, by the time
that he wrote this report, he had known that the press release had been
authorised by the panel, he appeared to express doubts about that matter. It was recognised that the statement did not
expressly state that it was being issued with the authority of the client. There was nothing sinister about the minor
changes in wording as between the statement which the panel had signed and the
statement which had been issued. A solicitor
was quite entitled to revise a statement to be made on behalf of a client into
clearer terms. It had to be appreciated
that, while the statement that had been issued was of a critical nature, it
related to a trial which had been surrounded by a general atmosphere of
hostility towards the panel, created by the media. Properly interpreted, the statement was not
an attack upon the jury, rather upon the atmosphere of hostility in which the
trial took place. Nor could it be said
that the statement amounted to an attack on the expert witness Evan Kohlmann. Rather, questions were raised concerning the
control of certain internet websites.
Furthermore, it could not be said, as the trial judge supposed, that the
statement amount to an attack on the independence of the prosecutor in the
case. Finally, although it was claimed
in the statement that the trial had been unfair, that, in itself,
could not amount to a contempt of court.
Such statements were frequently made, for example, in grounds of
appeal. While parts of the statement might
not have correctly reflected the terms of the convictions, they could not be
said to be untrue or seriously misleading.
It might be that the issue of a statement in the terms involved was not
in accordance with the best practice; however, it had been authorised by the
client and did not involve any breach of Law Society guidance. At the hearing before the trial judge on
[24] An opinion had
been obtained on behalf of the respondent from Professor Donald Nicolson,
Professor of Law at the
[25] Senior counsel
then proceeded to consider the effect of Article 10 of the
Convention. He submitted that the courts
should not use the law of contempt of court merely to uphold the dignity of the
bench in a narrow sense. It was
legitimate for anyone to comment on court decisions, as a matter of public
interest, even if the comment was unfavourable.
The present case differed materially from that of Kyprianou v
"This decision is a mockery of
justice. It stinks to high hell. It said it is okay to break the law and you
are immune so long as someone above you said to do it. Mr Dowson and I have lost faith in the
judicial system to render justice. We're
wondering what is the point of appealing and continuing this
charade of the courts in this country which are warped in favour of protecting
the police. The courts and the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police are sticking so close together you'd think they
were put together with Krazy Glue."
The subsequent issue which was considered was whether the
appellant's words amounted to contempt of court by scandalising the court as
that offence had been known at common law.
The issue also arose of whether the appellant was protected by the law
relating to freedom of expression. In
the end the appellant's appeal against his conviction for contempt of court was
allowed. Senior counsel contended that
this case demonstrated that courts ought to be able to bear trenchant criticism
without damage to the justice system.
Submissions on behalf
of Liberty
[27] Counsel for
[29] Counsel went
on then to consider the impact of Article 10 of the Convention in some
detail. In determining whether or not a
proposed interference with free speech amounted to a breach of Article 10,
the court first had to consider whether there had been, or would be, an
interference with the respondent's Article 10 rights. In so far as a quasi-criminal sanction might
be imposed on the respondent as a result of a statement to the press, he
submitted that there clearly would be such an interference. The court was required then to consider
whether the interference was prescribed by law, pursued at least one of the
legitimate aims set out in Article 10, and was "necessary in a democratic
society" for achieving that aim. In that
connection he relied upon De Haes and
Gijsel v
[30] There were a
number of factors which the court should consider in deciding whether, in the
present case, a finding of contempt would be consistent with
Article 10. The first feature of
the situation which deserved emphasis was that the statement in question had
been made following upon the conclusion of the trial. It was submitted that such comments should be
treated with care by the court. In
particular, it was recognised that some criticism of the courts and the court
process should be permitted. Members of
the public had a right to criticise the court free from the sanctions of the
law of contempt. That was so, even if
the language used was intemperate, or the terms of the criticism, in some
respects, erroneous. In
that connection counsel relied upon Milburn,
Appellant, at pages 315-316 and R
v Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis, ex parte
[31] A further
important point was that the European Court of Human Rights recognised that
legal representatives were in a special position vis à vis the court. Importance
had been attached by the trial judge to the respondent's position as agent
instructed by the panel. However, it was
submitted that, for the purposes of a finding of contempt of court, his
position as such was of limited relevance.
This was not a case like Kyprianou
v
[33] In the
circumstances of this case, the respondent's comments related to matters of
considerable contemporary public interest and concern. They contained at least an element of
political expression. Such statements
attracted the highest degree of protection from Article 10, as appeared
from A Guide to Human Rights in Scotland
2nd ed., Reed and Murdoch, paragraph 7.35.
The court should be slow to characterise such statements as a contempt
of court. Reliance was also placed on The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 245. That case showed that the protection of
Article 10 was available, not only to information or ideas that were favourably
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to
those that offended, shocked or disturbed the State, or any sector of the
population. Particular caution required
to be exercised by the court where what was in issue was not a verifiable fact,
but rather an expression of opinion, or a value judgment. In the present case, it was clear that the
respondent's statement contained a substantial element of value judgment. Much of what it contained had to be judged in
that light. In the statement the
respondent had said:
"This verdict is a tragedy for
justice and for freedom of speech and undermines the values that separate us
from the terrorist, the very values we should be fighting to protect."
What was to be found, at least in that passage, it was
submitted, was exactly the type of value judgment that the Convention
jurisprudence sought to protect. The
court should be cautious about characterising that as a contempt of court, lest
it be thought that any criticism of the court would not be tolerated. That would be a most undesirable result,
since, in a healthy democracy, the institutions and individuals that made and
administered the law must be prepared to subject themselves
to criticism from time to time.
Submissions of the
Advocate depute
[34] The Advocate depute made clear that, in
accordance with the invitation of the court, it was not his purpose to make
submissions on the merits of the issue before it, but rather to supplement or
correct any submissions made on behalf of the respondent regarding the facts or
the law. Senior counsel for the
respondent had submitted that there were no reported instances of the Scottish
courts making findings for contempt of court outwith three areas, namely (1)
conduct within the court that was an affront to the court's dignity; (2) defiance of an order of the court; and (3) the prohibitions of the Contempt of
Court Act 1981. The Advocate depute
submitted that that was wrong. There was
a category of case where critical comments might amount to a contempt of court,
beyond conduct within the court. It was
recognised by the law that comments made outwith the court could, depending
upon the nature of the comments, amount to contempt. In any event, it had to be recognised that
the protection afforded by Article 10 of the Convention was not
unlimited. It was qualified by the terms
of paragraph 2 of Article 10 which provided that the exercise of the
freedom of expression enshrined in Article 10.1 might be subject to
restrictions where these were "prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society ... for the protection of the reputation or rights of others ...
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary." It was evident that the law of contempt went
beyond the characterisation of it advanced on behalf of the respondent. In that connection reference was made to the
recommendations of the Phillimore Committee, which had examined the law of
contempt of court in both
The decision
[35] It is important, at the outset, to make
clear what is the nature of the present proceedings. On
"It is normal for the presiding judge
to decide if conduct amounts to contempt.
There may, however, be circumstances in which exceptionally it would be
inappropriate for him or her to do so.
In these circumstances the judge should remit the case to the High Court
at
In the present case the trial judge, having considered the
circumstances which had come to his attention, concluded that:
"In all these circumstances, since
the statements made by the agent may appear to be a criticism not only of the
jury, the prosecutor and a witness, but of my own conduct of the trial, I will
remit this matter for determination of the High Court in Edinburgh; ...".
It is that remit with which this court is concerned. Our duty is now to determine whether any of
the matters brought to our attention by the trial judge amount to a contempt of
court, or not. This procedure is not a
criminal trial, although the consequences of a determination that contempt had
been committed could be of a penal nature; rather, it is an inquiry into the question
remitted to us.
"Contempt of court is constituted by
conduct that denotes wilful defiance of, or disrespect towards, the court or
that wilfully challenges or affronts the authority of the court or the
supremacy of the law itself, whether in civil or criminal proceedings (Her Majesty's Advocate v Airs, Lord Justice General Emslie at
page 69; cf. Manson, Petitioner, at page 178)."
In paragraph [30] he continued:
"The power of the court to punish
contempt is inherent in the system of administration of justice (Hume on Crimes, ii, 138-141; Stair
Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol.6, para.301;
Hamilton v Anderson, L.C. Chelmsford at
p.373). That power is held by every
judge (Hume, ibid.; Erskine's Institute, I.ii.8). In Petrie
v Angus the nature of that power,
and the reasons for it, were described by Lord Justice Clerk McDonald as
follows:
'In all such cases it is in the power
and, indeed, it is the duty of the court, in order to protect the dignity,
quietness, and regularity of its proceedings, and to prevent defiance of its
orders, to deal with such acts of contempt, and it is the practice to do so
within the proceedings in which the contempt was committed, at once, and
without the necessity of any formal complaint, and this applies to both the
procedure in civil and criminal causes.' (at
p.363; cf. McDonald's Criminal Law (5th edn.) at p.266).
In Cordiner, Petitioner Lord Justice General Emslie described the
court's jurisdiction as follows:
'Both the Court of Session and this
court [sc. the High Court of Justiciary] have an inherent and necessary
jurisdiction to take effective action to vindicate their authority and preserve
the due and impartial administration of justice' (at p.18)."
Milburn, Appellant was a case in which the appellant
appealed to the Court of Session against a finding of contempt of court made
against him by the chairman of the
"It is always of the highest
importance, and especially in a process of contempt of court, that the court
should be most careful to exclude not only everything which might create
prejudice, but everything which might be thought to prejudice the court. It has been said over and over again that the
greatest restraint and discretion should be used by the court in dealing with
contempt of court, lest a process, the purpose of which is to prevent
interference with the administration of justice, should degenerate into an
oppressive or vindictive abuse of the court's powers. In the present case I regret to say that, in
my view, a perverse interpretation was put upon a letter which may have been
indiscreet and regrettable, but which was not directed towards interference
with the administration of justice. The
court should never forget that disappointed litigants sometimes feel aggrieved
and that some of them are ill-tempered, and that they may say or write things
which are foolish and reprehensible. The
court should be on its guard against putting an overstrained construction upon
such utterances, and above all it should not be too ready to find in them an
attempt to interfere with the administration of justice and to visit them with
the penal consequences of contempt of court."
Further observations which we consider helpful are to be
found in Johnson v Grant 1923 S.C. 789 at
page 790. There Lord President
Clyde said of contempt of court:
"The offence consists in interfering
with the administration of the law; in impeding and perverting the course
of justice ... it is not the dignity of the court which is offended - a petty and
misleading view of the issues involved - it is the fundamental supremacy of the
law which is challenged."
A similar view was expressed by Lord Ardmillan in
"... the true
dignity of Courts of Justice very rarely requires to be vindicated by such an
exercise of authority, and is most appropriately and effectually served by the
courtesy, discretion, and magnanimity which refine intercourse, engage
confidence, and command respect."
Once again, on the same theme, in R v Commissioner of Police of
the Metropolis, ex parte
"This is the first case, so far as I know, where this court has been called on to consider an
allegation of contempt against itself.
It is a jurisdiction which undoubtedly belongs to us but which we will
most sparingly exercise: more
particularly as we ourselves have an interest in the
matter.
Let me say at once that we will never
use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who
speak against us. We do not fear
criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself.
It is the right of every man, in
Parliament or out of it, in the press or over the broadcast, to make fair
comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully with
all that is done in a court of justice.
They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether
they are subject to appeal or not. All
we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature
of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into political
controversy. We must rely on our
conduct itself to be its own vindication.
Exposed as we are to the winds of
criticism, nothing which is said by this person or that, nothing which is
written by this pen or that, will deter us from doing what we believe is
right; nor, I would add, from saying
what the occasion requires, provided that it is pertinent to the matter in
hand. Silence is not an option when
things are ill done.
So it comes to this: Mr Quintin Hogg has criticised the court, but
in so doing he is exercising his undoubted right. The article contains an error, no doubt, but
errors do not make it a contempt of court.
We must uphold his right to the uttermost."
In the same case, Salmon L.J. at pages 155 to 156 said
this:
"The authority and reputation of our courts
are not so frail that their judgments need to be shielded from criticism, even
from the criticism of Mr Quintin Hogg.
Their judgments, which can, I think, safely be left to take care of
themselves, are often of considerable public importance. It is the inalienable right of everyone to
comment fairly upon any matter of public importance. This right is one of the pillars of
individual liberty - freedom of speech, which our courts have always
unfailingly upheld.
It follows that no criticism of a judgment,
however vigorous, can amount to a contempt of court, providing it keeps within
the limits of reasonable courtesy and good faith. The criticism here complained of, however rumbustious,
however wide of the mark, whether expressed in good taste or in bad taste,
seems to me to be well within these limits."
"The exercise of these freedoms,
since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society ... for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary."
That very matter is dealt with in Human Rights Law in Scotland, Reed and Murdoch, 2nd ed., para.7.47:
"... Article 10(2) specifically
identifies maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary as a
legitimate aim which may justify interference with expression. Insertion of this particular interest in
Article 10 appears to have been at the insistence of the
That latter matter was the subject of exploration by the
European Court of Human Rights in the Sunday
Times v The United Kingdom in
paragraph 55 of the judgment of the court:
"The court first emphasises that the
expression 'authority and impartiality of the judiciary' has to be understood
'within the meaning of the Convention'.
For this purpose account must be taken of the central position occupied
in this context by Article 6, which reflects the fundamental principle of
the rule of law.
The term 'judiciary' (pouvoir judiciaire) comprises the machinery of
justice or the judicial branch of government as well as the judges in their
official capacity. The phrase 'authority
of the judiciary' includes, in particular, the notion that the courts are, and
are accepted by the public at large as being, the proper forum for the
ascertainment of legal rights and obligations and the settlement of disputes
relative thereto;
further, the public at large have respect for and confidence in
the courts' capacity to fill that function.
It suffices, in this context, to
adopt the description of the general purposes of the law of contempt given by
the Phillimore Report. As can be seen
from paragraph 18 above, the majority of the categories of conduct covered
by the law of contempt relate either to the position of the judges or to the
functioning of the courts and of the machinery of justice: 'maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary' is therefore one purpose of that law."
The reference in the above paragraph to the Phillimore Report
is made clear by examining what was said of it in paragraph 18 of the
court's judgment. There it was observed
that;
"The Phillimore Report divides
contempt of court into the following categories: (a) 'contempt in the face of the court', for
example, throwing missiles at the judge, insulting persons in court,
demonstrating in court;
(b) 'contempt out of court', subdivided into: (i) reprisals against witnesses after the
conclusion of proceedings; (ii) 'scandalising
the court', for example abusing a judge qua
judge or attacking his impartiality or integrity; (iii) disobedience to court orders; (iv) conduct, whether intentional or not,
libelled to interfere with the course of justice in particular proceedings."
Thus, while
the importance of the right of freedom of expression enshrined in
Article 10(1) of the Convention can hardly be over-emphasised, it is
equally plain that that right has limits.
Certain of those limits are to be found in the law of contempt of court,
where the purpose to be served is the maintenance of the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.