![]() |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] [DONATE] | |
First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) >> Leighton v Information Commissioner [2025] UKFTT 424 (GRC) (14 April 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/GRC/2025/424.html Cite as: [2025] UKFTT 424 (GRC) |
[New search] [Printable PDF version] [Help]
Neutral citation number: [2025] UKFTT 424 (GRC)
Case Reference: FT/EA/2024/0291/GDPR
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Information Rights
Decided without a hearing
Decision given on: 14 April 2025
Before
JUDGE SAWARD
Between
WAYNE LEIGHTON
Applicant
and
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
Respondent
DECISION on rule 4(3) application
The appeal is struck out as the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine it, and there is no reasonable prospect of the Applicant's case, or part of it, succeeding.
REASONS
Background
1. On 13 January 2025 the Registrar stuck out the Applicant's appeal for want of jurisdiction and for having no reasonable prospects of success. The decision was taken on different grounds to those advanced by the Information Commissioner ("ICO").
2. By email dated 24 January 2025, the Applicant has asked for the Registrar's Decision to be considered afresh by a Judge pursuant to rule 4(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 ("the 2009 Rules"). Accordingly, I have considered this matter afresh.
3. The strike out was made because it was concluded that the Applicant was pursuing the right to rectification of inaccurate personal data under section 46 of the Data Protection Act 2018 ("the 2018 Act") and sought to exercise those rights through the ICO under section 51. An 'appeal' against the ICO's failure to act under section 51 of the 2018 Act fell outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction within section 166. The ICO had dealt with the complaint under section 165, which was found to be a misdirection.
4. The Registrar decided that the matter must be struck out, firstly, for lack of jurisdiction. The Decision stated that the strike out was made pursuant to rule 8(3)(a). That was an error as rule 8(3)(a) concerns failure to comply with a direction. The Registrar plainly meant rule 8(2)(a), which requires mandatory strike out in cases where the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction and does not transfer the appeal to another jurisdiction. The second reason for strike out was that there is no reasonable prospect of the Applicant's case succeeding, and correctly cited rule 8(3)(c).
5. The Applicant considers that the Registrar's decision was irrational for treating it as a complaint to process under section 166 and not an appeal under section 162.
Preliminary matter
6. When the application was made to this Tribunal on 1 dated 27 July 2024, the Applicant requested a hearing. There is no entitlement to a hearing in connection with strike out proceedings under rule 32(3). The Applicant has had opportunity to make submissions to the Tribunal on the strike out. I am satisfied that it is fair and just to proceed without a hearing, in line with the overriding objective under rule 2 of the 2009 Rules.
Reconsideration
7. The original complaint to the ICO dated 7 May 2024 concerned "inaccurate information placed on my credit file", which the Applicant had tried to have removed.
8. By decision dated 17 June 2024 the ICO decided to log the Applicant's concerns but take no further action. The ICO has applied to strike out the appeal under rule 8(2)(a) and 8(3)(c) of the 2009 Rules on the basis that the application shows no discernible grounds that would warrant the Tribunal exercising its powers under section 166(2) of the 2018 Act. The ICO states that having provided an outcome on 17 June 2024 and a reviewed outcome on 17 July 2024, there are no longer any procedural issues that remain outstanding for the Tribunal to make any order under section 166(2).
9. The Applicant refutes making an application to the Tribunal under section 166 of the 2018 Act. He emphasises that his complaint to the ICO was made under section 51 "to enforce my rights because Lowell had unlawfully processed my data, and indeed unlawfully registered a default on my Credit File."
10. The Applicant proceeds to say that the data processor does "not have authority to process the Applicant's data." Furthermore, the "alleged debt is registered to the wrong address". The Applicant confirms that he sought to enforce his rights through the ICO via section 51(1)(c) of the 2018 Act "to seek the lawfulness of the situation pursuant to section 51(2)(b)....". He contends that the ICO is in breach of sections 51(4) and (5) of the 2018 Act and has failed to enforce Part 3, pursuant to Schedule 13(1)(a). He also maintains that the ICO failed to take reasonable steps to find out if an actual debt exists and/or if the company concerned has the necessary authority to be a data controller.
11. For clarification, the Registrar did not treat this as an application under section 166 of the 2018 Act (following a complaint to the ICO under section 165). His decision carefully explained the Tribunal's jurisdiction under section 166 and why it does not apply, having noted that the ICO's response had focussed on sections 165 and 166.
12. I agree with the Registrar that the application before the Tribunal is not made under section 166 of the 2018 Act, as confirmed by the Applicant himself. Indeed, section 166 could not apply. The scope of the section is limited to orders requiring the ICO to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint or to inform the complainant of progress, whereas an outcome decision has already been issued to the Applicant.
13. Instead, the Applicant relies upon section 51 and a right of appeal under section 162.
14. Section 162(1) provides a person who is given any of the following notices a right of appeal to the Tribunal-
(a) an information notice;
(b) an assessment notice;
(c) an enforcement notice;
(d) a penalty notice;
(e) a penalty variation notice.
15. For clarity, an 'information notice' is a notice issued by the ICO under section 142 requiring the provision of information. It is not applicable here, nor does the ICO's decision fall within any of the other categories. As such, the Tribunal cannot consider the appeal under section 162 of the 2018 Act.
16. I concur with the Registrar that, based upon the application and subsequent submissions, the Applicant was pursuing the right to rectification of inaccurate personal data under section 46 of the 2018 Act, and he was seeking to exercise those rights through the ICO via section 51. Both sections are contained in Part 3 of the 2018 Act, and paragraph 1(1)(a) of Schedule 13 requires the ICO to monitor and enforce Part 3. The Registrar was correct to conclude that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider an 'appeal' against an alleged failure of the ICO to act in accordance with section 51 (or indeed paragraph 1(1)(a) by extension). The Tribunal's powers are limited to those given by the statute.
17. I note the ICO has pointed out that sections 46 and 51 do not apply in any event, as those sections are within Part 3 of the 2018 Act, which solely concerns the competent authorities listed in Schedule 7, and persons having statutory functions for law enforcement purposes (as defined in section 29 and 30). Given my findings that this Tribunal has no remit for the alleged breaches, I do not address this matter further.
18. Having considered the matter afresh, I agree with the Registrar that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Under rule 8(2)(a), there is no discretion to allow an appeal to proceed if it is outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Therefore, the Registrar had no alternative but to strike out the appeal. Similarly, I conclude that I have no alternative but to take the same action. Furthermore, given the lack of jurisdiction there is no reasonable prospect of the appeal, or any part of it, succeeding and it will also be struck out pursuant to rule 8(3)(c).
19. For all these reasons, I direct that this appeal be struck out.
Signed: Judge Saward
Date: 10 April 2025